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ABSTRACT
• Perceiving the Mentally 111: a Test of
an Inferential Path Model
(May 1976)
Ronald H. Doyen, B.A.
,
University of Kansas
M.A., University of Kansas, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Icek Ajzen
A review of the survey and experimental literature on
attitudes toward the mentally ill suggested that, while atti-
tudes have become somewhat more favorable in recent years,
the public still maintains quite negative views about the
mentally ill. The present study represented an attempt to
investigate some of the cognitive processes which might lead
to and sustain these views. A modified version of an inferen-
tial path model proposed by Kanouse (1971) was tested.
It was hypothesized that subjects would overgeneralize
the maladaptive behavior of a mentally ill stimulus person
relative to the same behavior performed by a stimulus person
diagnosed as not mentally ill. The adaptive behavior of the
mientally ill was expected to be undergeneral ized relative to
tLat of the not mentally ill. Subjects were expected to find
specific, situational explanations for maladaptive behavior
more acceptable when the stimulus person was not mentally
ill, and to find specific, situational explanations for adap-
tive behavior more acceptable when the stimulus person was
mentally ill. These mediating inferences were hypothesized
Vto facilitate the attribution of negative general disposi-
tions to the mentally ill and positive general dispositions to
the not mentally ill.
The operationalization of the model was not fully ade-
quate to allow proper tests of all of the hypotheses. Never-
theless, the model received partial support. A number of
related social perception issues were examined and discussed,
including the applicability of Wyer's (1970) subjective prob-
ability model to the present research topic, and the order in
which information is typically processed.
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Perceiving the Mentally 111: a Test of
an Inferential Path Model
Ronald H. Doyen
University of Massachusetts
The present study is concerned with the general issue
of how people perceive the mentally ill. in the first
part of the paper previous survey and experimental research
on attitudes toward the mentally ill is reviewed. Then, a
model which attempts to specify some of the ways in which
people process information about the mentally ill is pro-
posed. An empirical test of the model is reported, and a
number of related issues are discussed.
Surveys of Attitudes toward the Mentally 111
Two general types of surveys have been conducted in
attempts to investigate public attitudes toward the mentally
ill. The first type of survey involves a direct inquiry
into attitudes and beliefs regarding mental illness. In
the second approach respondents are presented with brief
descriptions of individuals exhibiting various "textbook"
symptoms of psychiatric disorder. They are then asked to
identify the individuals whom they consider mentally ill,
and often complete other measures as well. Surveys primarily
employing direct attitude assessment will be considered first,
and then attention will be directed tov/ard surveys of the
second type.
One of the earliest systematic surveys of public atti-
tudes toward the mentally ill was conducted by Ramsey and
Seipp (1948). A representative sample of the adult popula-
tion of Trenton, New Jersey was asked six questions regard-
ing the nature and etiology of mental illness. The majority
of those surveyed did not believe than insanity was God's
punishment for sin or wrongdoing, and nearly all of the
respondents felt that the mentally ill could benefit from
treatment. Those of higher educational and occupational
status tended to cite emotional and physical difficulties as
causes of "insanity," while less educated individuals were
more likely to specify environmental or behavioral causes
(e.g., overeating, alcoholism, overwork). The former group
was more optimistic about recovery, more likely to recommend
professional treatment, and less likely to believe it is
harmful to be associated with the insane.
In 1950 a study of the mental health attitudes of the
residents of Louisville, Kentucky was conducted. The survey,
one of a series designed to determine what local citizens
thought about problems of city administration, involved
structured interviews with a representative sample of the
city's adult population (Woodward, 1951). Most respondents
viewed mental illness as a condition requiring sympathy
and treatment rather than punishment or ridicule. Seventy-
five percent felt that there were not enough doctors or
hospitals in Louisville to take care of the mentally ill.
Most respondents held generally favorable attitudes toward
psychiatric treatment, but indicated that they would seek
such help for emotional problems only as a last resort.
The family doctor, members of the family, clergymen, and
friends were more often mentioned as sources of help.
The results of the Louisville and Trenton surveys have
been interpreted as indicating that the public had, by
about 1950, largely abandoned the blatant fear and rejection
which had characterized attitudes toward the mentally ill
in earlier years (Crocetti, Spiro, and Siassi, 1974). The
public was described as moving toward a humanitarian and
scientific view of the mentally ill (Ramsey and Seipp,
1948), However, more recent evidence suggests that this
view was overly optimistic, and that public acceptance of
the mentally ill is, even now, of a rather limited nature.
Nunnally (1961) has conducted one of the most thorough
and widely known inquiries into public knowledge and opinions
about a variety of mental health issues. A sample of Illi-
nois residents representative of the entire United States
in terms of sex, race, education, income, and religion was
employed. These respondents indicated the extent to which
they agreed with over 3,000 statements related to mental
health obtained from professional publications, media pre-
sentations of mental health material, and extensive interviews
4with the public. The data were factor analyzed, and a 50-
item questionnaire was designed which measures each of the
ten factors which emerged. The factors describe specific
beliefs about mental illness, and include the views that the
actions and appearance of the mentally ill are distinguish-
able from those of the normal, that women and the elderly
are especially prone to mental illness, that willpower and
control of one's morbid thoughts can help one avoid mental
problems, and that mental illness is a hopeless condition.
Endorsement of these views was quite high among the public,
and rather low among mental health professionals. Responses
to the 50-item questionnaire led Nunnally to conclude that
beliefs about mental illness are not highly structured or
highly crystallized. Respondents tended not to have logi-
cally coherent opinions, and were quite willing to change
them.
To get a more complete picture of public attitudes
toward the mentally ill, Nunnally employed a form of the
semantic differential scale (Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum,
1957). Subjects rated terms such as old man, neurotic man,
average man, etc. on a series of 7-point scales. The re-
sults of this portion of the study revealed that the mentally
ill were viewed quite negatively, and were described as rela-
tively, worthless
,
cold, unpredictable, dangerous, insincere,
and dirty. In a recent study employing Nunnally's semantic
differential measures, Olmsted and Durham (1976) found
that such beliefs are still quite prevalent among the
college students they surveyed.
Gumming and Gumming (1957) surveyed the attitudes of
two small towns in Ganada in an assessment of the effec-
tiveness of a mental health education campaign. The 6-
month campaign, consisting primarily of films and group
discussions, proved to be largely ineffective. Using
Guttman's scaling techniques, the investigators found that
the members of the communities expressed a willingness to
live in the same neighborhood with former mental patients,
but were not willing to room with them or to have any other
close association with them. Further, the community resi-
dents felt little responsibility for the condition of the
mentally ill, and were quite tolerant of poor hospital
conditions and patient isolation.
Cohen and Struening (1962) developed a widely used
multi-dimensional scale, Opinions about Mental Illness
(OMI), by factor analyzing responses to a pool of Likert-
type items. The five factors measured by the OMI include
the following:
A: Authoritarianism. Highly correlated with the Califor-
nia F Scale, this factor involves submission to authority,
anti-intraception , and a belief that the mentally ill are
an inferior group who should be separated from normals
6and handled coercively.
B: Benevolence. A sort of kindliness to unfortunates
based on religious and humanitarian grounds.
C: Mental Hygiene Ideology. Acceptance of the ideas that
the mentally ill are willing to work, capable of skilled
work, trustworthy, and generally not much different from
normal people.
D: Social Restrictiveness
. Mental patients are viewed as
a threat to society, and should therefore be restricted in
their social contacts (e.g., the right to marry, have con-
tact with their children, etc.) both during and after hos-
pitalization.
E: Interpersonal Etiology. The belief that mental illness
is caused by unfortunate interpersonal experiences, partic-
ularly love deprivation during childhood.
The factor structure of the OMI has been found to be
relatively stable across population samples (Struening and
Cohen, 1963) and time (Dielman, Stiefel, and Cattell, 1973).
Scores on Factors A and D tend to be moderately related,
as do scores on Factors B and C. This instrument has been
used in a number of studies comparing the attitudes of
various groups. One of the most interesting comparative
studies examined the attitudes of personnel affiliated with
Veterans Administration Psychiatric Hospitals (Cohen and
Struening, 1962). Blue-collar workers, including aides and
kitchen workers, were quite Authoritarian and Socially Re-
strictive, and were not very strong in Benevolence and
Mental Hygiene Ideology. Psychologists and social workers
presented a mirror image of the blue-collar workers.
Clergymen and, to an extent, psychiatrists held attitudes
similar to but less extreme than those of the psychologists
and social workers. Cohen and Struening (1964, 1965) found
that the atmosphere of a hospital is largely determined by
the attitudes of nurses and aides and that authoritarian-
restrictive atmospheres were associated with lower discharge
rates.
In addition to the work of Cohen and Struening, a large
number of studies have examined the mental health attitudes
of selected populations. The opinions of doctors, lawyers,
teachers, nurses, community leaders, and various ethnic
groups and nationalities have come under scrutiny. All
personnel involved in the delivery of psychological services
have been extensively studied, as have mental patients and
their families. Detailed consideration of these studies is
beyond the scope of this review. Many are discussed by
Rabkin (1972, 1974), Sarbin and Manusco (1970), and Cro-
cetti, Spiro, and Siassi (1974). While it is difficult to
briefly summarize the findings of such a large body of
literature, it may be noted that, with a few exceptions,
attitudes of selected groups have not differed substantially
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from those of the general public (see, e.g., Sarbin and
Manusco, 1970; Rabkin, 1972; Farina and Felner, 1973).
All of the findings discussed thus far are based on
surveys, or portions of surveys, in which the respondents
were directly asked for their opinions about mental illness
and the mentally ill. A second approach is directed toward
examining the respondents' reactions to deviant behavior
which is usually not explicitly identified as mental ill-
ness. Studies of this type will now be considered.
The survey which has served as a model for many subse-
quent investigations of the perception of deviant behavior
was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center of
the University of Chicago in 1950 (Star, 1955; discussed in
Halpert, 1970). The study involved 3,500 90-minute inter-
views with a representative cross section of the American
public. In the interviews respondents were given brief
descriptions of six individuals exhibiting major symptoms
of paranoid schizophrenia, simple schizophrenia, alcoholism,
an anxiety neurosis, a compulsive phobia, and a childhood
character disorder. The interviewees were asked, for each
case, whether they thought something was wrong with the
person, what was wrong, what could have caused the condi-
tion, and whether the person should be considered mentally
ill. Seventy-five percent of the respondents regarded the
paranoid schizophrer.ic as mentally ill, but none of the
other individuals was considered mentally ill by more than
34 percent. One-sixth of the respondents did not view any
of the cases as mental illness; one-third perceived mental
illness only in the paranoid case.
Respondents were also asked for their own definitions
of mental illness. Those who included neurotic as well as
psychotic symptoms in their definitions tended to perceive
mental illness in a greater number of cases than those whose
definitions were less inclusive. However, including cer-
tain symptoms within one's abstract definition did not
necessarily mean that a case exhibiting these symptoms would
be identified as mentally ill. For example, only 20 per- '
cent of those who included anxiety in their definition
labeled the anxiety neurotic mentally ill. Many people
stated in their abstract definitions that there are many
different kinds and degrees of mental illness, but included
only extreme psychosis in their actual working definition.
Star concluded that people tend not to regard behavior as
proof of mental illness unless there is evidence of a loss
of cognitive functioning; a loss of self-control, usually to
the point of violence; and inappropriate behavior which
is difficult to explain rationally.
The Louisville survey (Woodward, 1951) discussed pre-
viously employed case descriptions similar to Star's, with
similar results. The unwillingness of the public to view
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behavior problems as indicative of mental illness was
clearly in evidence. For instance, only two percent identi-
fied a schizophrenic girl as mentally ill, and only four
percent felt that she should see a psychiatrist. Common
sense measures were frequently recommended to help the
individuals described. Only seven percent recommended
sending a paranoid woman to a mental hospital, yet thirteen
percent recommended that the woman's husband stay at home
and prove that he loves her, and twenty-one percent said
that he should give her a "good-talking-to.
Another previously discussed study (Gumming and Gumming,
1957) yielded findings comparable to those of Star and Wood-
ward. Using Star's original case descriptions, the Cummings
found that 69 percent of the respondents considered the
paranoid schizophrenic mentally ill, but that each of the
other individuals was viewed as mentally ill by only a
minority. The percentages of respondents identifying the
remaining cases as mentally ill ranged from 36 for the simple
schizophrenic to four for the compulsive phobic and the boy
with the character disorder.
More recent evidence suggests that the Star cases are
now more likely to be viewed as mentally ill. In a study of
community leaders in the Washington Heights area of New
York City, Dohrenwend, Bernard, and Kolb (1962) found that
the percentages of respondents identifying the cases as
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mentally ill ranged from 100 for the paranoid schizophrenic
to 40 for the compulsive phobic. In a follow-up survey of
residents of the same area, Dohrenwend (1966) obtained some-
what lower proportions. Still, 90 percent of those surveyed
identified the paranoid schizophrenic as mentally ill, 67
percent the simple schizophrenic, 31 percent the anxiety
neurotic, and 24 percent the compulsive phobic. These
studies, as well as a similar one by Lemkau and Crocetti
(1962) which employed three of the Star vignettes, suggest
an increasing tendency for the public to regard deviant
behavior as mental illness. Nevertheless, it should be
noted that, with the exception of the psychotic cases, the
percentages are rarely overwhelming, and are certainly
much smaller than one would expect if the public had adopted
the professional's diagnostic standards which have been
advocated in public mental health education campaigns. Fur-
ther, Dohrenwend and Chin-Shong (1967) have shown that, with
the exception of the paranoid schizophrenic, the Star cases
do not strike respondents as having particularly serious
problems. Thus, if perceived seriousness may be used as an
(inverse) indicator of acceptance of deviant behavior, the
recent studies may be viewed as consistent with the proposi-
tion that the public continues to be rather tolerant of
several kinds of deviant behavior which professionals would
diagnose as mental illness.
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A number of studies have suggested that the tendency
to reject those whose behavior deviates from prescribed
norms depends heavily on the extent to which it represents
potential harm or irritation to others. Dohrenwend and
Chin-Shong (1967) argued that, while psychiatrists judge
the seriousness of mental health problems on the basis of
"underlying pathology," laymen's evaluations are based on
the threat to others. However, Manis, Hunt, Brawerm, and
Kercher (1965) found that psychiatrists as well as the
general public were strongly influenced by the social visi-
bility of symptoms in deciding which of 20 cases to label
mentally ill.
Phillips (1964) found that rejection of the deviant,
measured by a social distance scale, was more strongly in-
fluenced by the visibility of the deviation than by intra-
psychic pathology. For example, a depressed neurotic de-
scribed as sometimes losing his temper and disturbing others
was more strongly rejected than a simple schizophrenic who
was quite withdrawn. In an earlier study Phillips (1963)
used slightly modified Star case descriptions and a descrip-
tion of a "normal" individual. Five different cases were
described as seeking help from five different sources —
no help source, a clergyman, a physician, a psychiatrist,
and a mental hospital. The cases were increasingly rejected
in the order above. The largest increase in rejection
13
occurred when the person was described as seeking help from
a psychiatrist rather than a physician. Thus, rejection
was particularly strong when the help sought could be
viewed as an indication that the person suffered from mental
illness. In fact, a normal individual who sought help from
a mental hospital was rejected more than two neurotics who
sought no help. The behavior description variable also had
a strong effect on rejection, but did not interact with the
help source variable. The paranoid schizophrenic was very
strongly rejected, the simple schizophrenic and the two
neurotics were moderately rejected, and the normal person
elicited little rejection.
The weight of the evidence from surveys investigating
the public's perception of deviant behavior suggests that
the layman is not particularly disturbed by several kinds
of behavior which would be diagnosed as mental illness by
professionals. He is unlikely to employ the mental ill-
ness label except in rather extreme cases involving psy-
chotic or disruptive behavior. On the surface, these find-
ings seem inconsistent with the negative attitudes gener-
ally expressed toward those identified as mentally ill.
On the one hand, the mentally ill are strongly rejected;
on the other hand, symptoms of mental illness are not
viewed particularly unfavorably.
These two general propositions are not consistent with
all of the survey data which have been collected, but they
do seem to reflect the major trends of most available
studies. Limiting conditions for the validity of one or
both propositions have been found in a number of studies.
Having a mentally ill friend or relative was found to be
associated with decreased rejection of individuals des-
cribed as seeking help from a psychiatrist or mental hos-
pital (Phillips, 1964). Age has had an effect on mental
health attitudes in a number of studies, with younger re-
spondents reacting more favorably to those described as
mentally ill (Gumming and Gumming, 1957; Freeman, 1961).
Case descriptions identifying the deviant person as female
elicit consistently less rejection than male case descrip-
tions, whether the cases are identified as mentally ill or
not (Phillips, 1964; Grocetti, Spiro, and Siassi, 1974).
A large number of studies have examined the impact of the
respondent's race, educational level, occupational status,
and other demographic variables on his views regarding men-
tal illness. Although the findings are not wholly consis-
tent, many studies have found a stronger tendency to iden-
tify deviant behavior as mental illness, as well as more
favorable attitudes toward those diagnosed as mentally ill,
among higher socioeconomic groups (Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend,
1969). These studies, and many others not cited, make it
15
clear that the two propositions advanced above do not de-
scribe universal human propensities, nor are they intended
to do so. As indicated previously, the propositions are
offered as summaries of general trends in the survey liter-
ature on attitudes toward mental illness.
The two sets of findings have led to considerable con-
fusion in the literature, and various attempts have been
made to explain one or both sets on the basis of individual
or societal needs. Gumming and Gumming (1957), building on
Durkeim's classic sociological theory of punishment, argued
that negative attitudes toward the mentally ill serve the
function of reaffirming group solidarity. Punishing de-
'
viants reassures nondeviant members of society that the
prevalent social structure will remain stable. Gumming
and Gumming also comment on the refusal of the public to
identify the Star case descriptions as mental illness, not-
ing that this may reflect use of the defense mechanism of
denial. Star (1957, cited in Grocetti, Spiro, and Siassi,
1974) argued that "mental illness" is interpreted by the
public to mean the loss of man's rationality and self-con-
trol, two of his most distinctively human qualities. Hence,
it is perceived as very fearful and threatening, and is
viewed as an appropriate description of behavior only in
very extreme cases. Gilbert and Levinson (1956) interpret
"custodial" attitudes toward the mentally ill as a reflection
16
of the underlying psychological needs of the authoritarian
personality (Adorno, Frenkel
-Brunswick
,
Levinson, and San-
ford, 1950).
Two recent attempts to review and interpret the litera-
ture on public opinions about the mentally ill have led
their authors to quite different conclusions. Since these
works are among the most recent reviews of public mental
health attitudes, and since the issues they raise are quite
interesting and important, they will be examined in some
detail. Two primary areas of disagreement stand out.
Sarbin and Manusco (1970, 197<^)
,
following a line of reason-
ing similar to that advanced in the present review, argue
that public attitudes toward the mentally ill are perhaps
more favorable than in the past, but are still quite nega-
tive. On the other hand, Crocetti, Spiro, and Siassi (1974;
Crocetti, Spiro, Lemkau, and Siassi, 197^) maintain that
there is little evidence that the mentally ill are now
strongly rejected. The second area of disagreement involves
the desirability of promoting a "sick role" conception of
mental illness. Crocetti and his colleagues favor such a
conception, while Sarbin and Manusco are opposed. The two
areas of disagreement will be considered separately.
In building their case against what they describe as
the "theory of rejection" of the mentally ill, Crocetti,
Spiro, and Siassi make occasional use of a common but
17
logically fallacious technique. The technique involves
advancing an extreme argument in favor of an opposing point
of view, citing evidence inconsistent with that argument,
and then concluding that the opposite must be true. Thus,
they note that people today tend not to believe that the
mentally ill should be "locked up," that mental patients
are less strongly rejected than Negroes or German Jews in
the 1920s, and that most people who know someone who has
been hospitalized because of mental illness do not deny it
when asked by an interviewer. Abandonment of the stereo-
types and fears of the past is taken to indicate high pub-
lic acceptance of the mentally ill. In addition, in errors
unbecoming to professional researchers, an article by those
who have criticized Crocetti's earlier work (Sarbin and
Manusco, 1970) has been incorrectly quoted twice within a
single paragraph (p. 141). Such errors might lead one to
reject out of hand anything these authors have to say.
However, much of their reasoning is based on a sounder
foundation, and many of their arguments are worthy of con-
sideration.
To a large extent, the controversy about the favor-
ability of attitudes toward the mentally ill results from
the use of different criteria for what constitute favorable
attitudes. Relying heavily on recent social distance data
collected by themselves and others, Crocetti, Spiro, and
18
Siassi maintain that people now refuse to put much social
distance between themselves and the mentally ill. in a
survey of a sample of the Baltimore United Auto Workers mem-
bership conducted in 1970, the investigators found that 90
percent of the respondents indicated a willingness to work
with a former mental patient, 79 percent would not object
to rooming with an ex-patient, and 64 percent could imagine
themselves falling in love with one. Sarbin and Manusco,
while not having the most recent data available at the time
of their article, emphasize the percentages of people who
are unwilling to have close relationships with the mentally
ill. Commenting on an earlier survey (Lemkau and Crocetti,
1962), Sarbin and Manusco suggest that the findings that
about half of the Lemkau and Crocetti sample could conceive
of rooming with and falling in love with ex-patients are not
sufficient to indicate high public acceptance of the men-
tally ill. It is not clear how they would interpret the
evidence of increasing acceptance in the recent survey. It
is possible that the appearance of more favorable attitudes
is due to increasing sophistication among the general pub-
lic, as is apparent in recent studies directly inquiring
about racial attitudes (Jones, 1972; Ehrlich, 1973). Not
wanting to appear prejudiced in their responses to items
whose purpose is quite transparent, as social distance
items are, respondents may verbalize favorable attitudes.
19
On the other hand, one may grant that the recent Cro-
cetti, Spiro, and Siassi data reflect genuine increases in
the public's willingness to associate with the mentally
ill without necessarily accepting their conclusion that
rejection of the mentally ill is largely a thing of the
past. This view, as they clearly acknowledge, is a minority
opinion. While future evidence may support their conten-
tions, most presently available studies do not. Within
their own recent survey there is evidence that acceptance
of the mentally ill at relatively intimate levels is quite
limited. In one study only 24 percent of the respondents
indicated that they would definitely be willing to rent a
room to a former mental patient, and only 12 percent indi-
cated a definite willingness to have their child marry a
former patient. These percentages were raised to only 31
and 18, respectively, when the ex-patient was described to
a separate sample as a respectable man with a good job,
quite a few friends who find him easy to get along with, and
plans to marry a nice young woman. That ex-patienthood is
still a stigmatizing condition is evidenced when one exa-
mines the proportions of respondents expressing uncondi-
tional acceptance of the same individual, from whose de-
scription the mention of mental illness had been omitted.
Fifty-five percent described themselves as definitely
willing to rent a room to this man, and 57 percent were
20
definitely willing to have their child marry him.
The authors' divergent views regarding the desirability
of a "sick role" conception of mental illness follow, in
part, from their conclusions about current public attitudes
toward the mentally ill. m addition, quite different as-
pects of the sick role are stressed. Crocetti, Spiro, and
Siassi maintain that the public has rather favorable atti-
tudes toward the mentally ill and defines a wide range of
its own problems as mental illness. Most people have
friends or family members who have been treated for mental
disorders, which suggests to them that virtually anyone
may be afflicted by such disorders. Crocetti and his co-
workers argue that once this notion of universal vulner-
ability to a condition is accepted by members of a social
system, the conception of the condition as deviance becomes
untenable within that society. Individuals who believe
that they, and those close to them, may become mentally
ill find it unnecessary and undesirable to label the men-
tally ill as deviants deserving negative sanctions for
their behavior. Rather, the mentally ill are labeled as
"sick," and are to be accorded the rights and privileges
of the sick role. Such rights and privileges include sym-
pathy from others, professional treatment for the illness,
and temporary relief from one's job and other social re-
sponsibilities.
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Sarbin and Manusco's analysis differs on almost every
point. The public is described as not defining either its
own personal problems or the deviant behavior of others as
mental illness. The public's tolerance for deviant behavior
is believed to be rather high. However, when deviant behav-
ior is identified as mental illness, relatively strong re-
jection occurs. Sarbin and Manusco note that one of the
principal aims of almost all recent mental health education
campaigns has been to encourage the public to apply the
"mental illness metaphor" to an increasing variety of behav-
ior problems. They argue that it is fortunate that the
campaigns have not been very successful, since more wide-
spread usage of the mental illness label might well lead to
increased rejection of the deviants so labeled.
Sarbin and Manusco discuss a number of reasons for the
public's reluctance to accept the professional's conception
of mental illness as it has been presented in public educa-
tion efforts. Two central reasons for this reluctance are
the most important for present purposes. First, the public,
like professionals, has difficulty in developing classifica-
tion rules by which such diverse conditions as paranoid
schizophrenia and alcoholism may be considered as manifes-
tations of the same entity, "mental illness." Since it
seems illogical to attach the mental illness label to so
many conditions with so little in common, the public.
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unlike the professionals, reserves the term for rather ex-
treme behavior problems. Secondly, the public is unwilling
to accept the "nonperson" status accorded the mentally ill
by professionals for almost anyone who has interpersonal
and other difficulties. The diagnosed mental patient is
viewed as a nonperson in that he cannot manage his own af-
fairs, he is unable to "deal with reality," and he is given
little responsibility for designing and implementing solu-
tions to his own problems. These aspects of the sick role
which the public sees assigned to the mentally ill make the
role unacceptable to them.
Sarbin and Manusco view the public as correctly refus-
ing to categorize diverse behavior problems as mental ill-
ness, and as correctly apprehending the basic features of
the mentally ill role. For these reasons, and because of
what they view as logical fallacies inherent in the mental
illness concept as it has evolved, as well as the unfortunate
social consequences arising from its promulgation (see, e.g.,
Szasz, 1961; Sarbin, 1967), Sarbin and Manusco oppose a sick
role concept of mental illness.
The empirical basis for the investigators' views has
already been discussed, and it will be recalled that the
present review reached conclusions about the nature of cur-
rent attitudes toward the mentally ill quite similar to
those of Sarbin and Manusco. Hence, it should be clear that
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we do not agree with Crocetti, Spiro, and Siassi's conclu-
sions that the public currently demands that a wide range of
behavior problems be defined as mental illness, and insists
that individuals suffering from these problems be treated
in much the same way as those suffering from physical ill-
ness. Still, certain arguments presented in support of
their views suggest interesting possibilities. The notion
that a condition will cease to be considered as deviance and
will begin to be viewed as illness when the public believes
in universal vulnerability to the condition is a particularly
intriguing sociological hypothesis.
The aspects of the sick role concept stressed by the
different authors present a strikingly different picture
of what one means by the term "sick role." Crocetti, Spiro,
and Siassi emphasize the temporary incapacity of the sick,
and their right to sympathy and treatment. Sarbin and
Manusco stress the nonperson status of the mentally ill
role. The former authors argue that defining behavior
problems as illness exempts one from the punitive treatment
often given to the deviant. The latter authors propose that
such a definition results in even more inhumane treatment
than that which would result if the problems were defined
as social deviance (and certainly more than if they were
not defined as serious problems at all).
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The argument that the sick role exempts one from treat
ment as a deviant was advanced by Goffman (1963) in dis-
cussing physical illness. Crocetti, Spiro, and Siassi
maintain that a virtually identical role is appropriate for
the mentally ill. They note the interrelatedness of physio
logical and behavioral functioning, and suggest that the
public now recognizes the fallacious nature of "Descartes'
myth," i.e., that the mind and body are separate entities.
Such recognition is believed to make it unnecessary for
people to hold one set of attitudes toward physical illness
and another set toward mental illness. Empirical evidence
is cited which shows that attitudes toward both types of
illness are influenced by the chronicity of the condition,
and the extent to which the condition might disturb others.
The Crocetti, Spiro, and Siassi analysis suggests
several plausible reasons for assuming some commonality in
the roles people are willing to assign to those with phy-
sical and mental illness. However, another line of argu-
ment (Szasz, 1961; Sarbin, 1967) proposes that a whole com-
plex of attitudes attached to the public view of mental
illness makes it difficult for people to assign Goffman's
sick role to the behaviorally deviant. For example, the
public recognizes that deviant behavior typically has
greater social implications than physical illness. De-
viant social behavicr affects others quite directly, and
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often poses more of a threat to a social relationship than
physical illness. Further, physical illness tends to be
more amenable to diagnosis and treatment, and recovery more
complete. And, importantly, an individual is held more
responsible for his social behavior than for his biological
functions. There are exceptions to these general state-
ments, of course, but they do suggest reasons the public
might have for not viewing the sick role as a fully appro-
priate one for those who adopt deviant solutions to life's
problems. Sarbin and Manusco's discussion of nonperson
status points out several of the more unfortunate aspects of
the particular sick role which has evolved for the diagnosed
mentally ill.
Experimental Studies of Interactions with the Mentally 111
and Other Stigmatized Groups
The attitude survey has been by far the most common
source of information about public views of the mentally
ill. Experimental studies involving contact with individ-
uals subjects believe to be mentally ill are a relatively
recent development, and have been largely ignored in re-
views of the literature on attitudes toward the mentally
ill. Rabkin (1972) does discuss a number of studies which
show that contact with the mentally ill may result in more
favorable attitudes, particularly when combined with a
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mental health education program. However, several studies
which systematically examine the dynamics of the interac-
tion between a mentally ill or other stigmatized individual
and a normal person have been omitted from Rabkin's and
other recent literature reviews. Studies of this nature
will be examined in this section. Before turning our atten-
tion to these studies, however, we shall briefly discuss
the nature of the relationship between mental illness and
other stigmatizing conditions.
Goffman's (1963) excellent treatment of stigmata
assumes that the stigmatized may be divided into two prin-
cipal categories — the "discredited" and the "discredit-
able." A discredited individual is one whose stigma is
known to others. Although this is often because the stigma
is an apparent physical characteristic, it need not be the
case. For example, a divorcee living in a conservative
small town might well be discredited within her community.
Discreditable people are those whose stigmatizing condition
is unknown to those with whom they are interacting. Goff-
man depicts the discredited and discreditable as having
fundamentally different sets of problems in their interac-
tions with others. The discreditable individual's problems
are primarily those of "information management," i.e., de-
ciding what information to reveal to whom, when, etc. The
discredited person, however, knows that others are aware
of his stigma, and is more concerned with "tension manage-
ment" when he encounters others.
Different stigmatizing conditions within one of Goff-
man's two principal categories are, for the most part,
treated as uniform in their consequences. Thus, a discred-
ited individual is viewed as having the same fundamental
problems whether he is a member of a disliked ethnic group,
an amputee, a blind man, or an ex-convict. The assumption
that quite similar consequences are associated with a
variety of stigmata has a certain intuitive appeal. It
seems that people tend to avoid interacting with the stig-
matized and to feel uncomfortable when in their presence,
regardless of the particular stigma involved. Many stig-
matized groups seem to suffer social and economic discrimina-
tion. Examining some of the available empirical evidence
provides some support for these intuitions. For example,
blacks (Ehrlich, 1973; Jones, 1972) and ex-mental patients
(Farina and Felner, 1973) both have difficulty in securing
employment. Both groups are low in socioeconomic status
relative to national norms (Jones, 1972; Braginsky, Bragin-
sky, and Ring, 1969), and both groups are fairly strongly
rejected on social distance measures (Harding, et al.,
1959; Crocetti, Spiro, and Siassi, 1974). One could al-
most certainly find other evidence of similarities between
blacks and ex-mental patients, and between other pairs of
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stigmatized groups. However, other available evidence
suggests that the view that the discredited are perceived
and treated in a uniform way is an oversimplified notion.
Kleck, et al. (1968) employed a figure placement task
in an investigation of the distance which college students
put between themselves and other individuals of various
descriptions. Figures representing a friend and a liked
professor were placed closest to a figure representing the
subject, while one representing a disliked professor was
placed farthest away. On this particular rejection measure,
a blind person, a Negro, a stranger, and an amputee were
more strongly rejected than the friend or liked professor.
However, an epileptic and a mental patient elicited signif-
.
icantly greater rejection than any of these groups. The
disliked professor evoked still greater distance scores.
Lamy (1956) gave subjects a number of statements which they
were required to choose as more characteristic of either an
ex-mental patient or an ex-convict. The ex-convict was
generally viewed more favorably. For example, he was chosen
as more reliable in an emergency, more able to deter rein-
stitutionalization, more responsible as an employee, and
less likely to generate tension and anxiety in his family.
Freed (1964) compared attitudes toward mental illness,
alcoholism, and physical disability. The results showed
that the mentally ill were viewed more negatively than the
other groups.
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There is evidence, then, for both similarities and dif-
ferences in the way various stigmatized groups are perceived
and treated. Experimental studies involving interactions
between stigmatized and nonstigmatized individuals do little
to clarify the nature of public responses to different
types of stigmata. Most of the available studies dealing
with a particular stigma have not been sufficiently similar
to those dealing with other stigmata to allow meaningful
comparisons (see, e.g., Ehrlich, 1973). An exception occurs
in the case of the research programs of Farina and Kleck.
Each investigator has conducted a series of laboratory
studies of interactions between normal subjects and confed-
erates who enact the role of a stigmatized person. Farina
and his colleagues have focused primarily on mental ill-
ness, while Kleck and his co-workers have dealt almost ex-
clusively with physical stigmata. The major findings of
these two research programs, and of other relevant studies,
will be briefly reviewed in the remainder of this section.
First, findings with respect to the dependent measures
which the Kleck and Farina research programs have in common
will be discussed. Then, findings of other experimental
studies involving interactions with the mentally ill will
be reviewed. Finally, a very brief review of Kleck 's
other findings regarding physical stigmata will be provided,
since these studies suggest several variables which could
30
easily be examined in studies of interactions with the men-
tally ill.
A few studies have explored the willingness of subjects
to interact with the stigmatized. Farina and Ring (1965)
had subjects work on a cooperative motor task with an indi-
vidual whom they believed to be either an ex-mental patient
or a normal person. Subjects in the two conditions reported
an equal willingness to interact with their partner in the
future on a similar sort of task. In a study with "real-
life" implications, female employees of a department store
were asked to interview a prospective employee, and to
evaluate her qualifications and suitability for a job in
the interviewer's department. "Ex-patient" interviewees
were recommended just as strongly as "normal" applicants
(Farina, Felner, and Boudreau, 1973). Kleck, Ono, and
Hastorf (1966) examined the willingness of subjects to in-
teract with a physically stigmatized individual on a short-
term basis in two separate experiments. In the first ex-
periment subjects terminated a structured interview with a
normal other earlier than an interview with a person in a
wheelchair. In the second experiment, the physical dis-
ability was made more obvious by employing a wheelchair
which made the confederate appear to be a left-leg amputee.
Other procedural changes made the purpose of the interac-
tion more ambiguous, and the role relationship between the
participants less clear. Under these conditions, there was
a tendency for subjects to terminate the interaction with
the disabled confederate earlier than the interaction with
the normal confederate. However, this tendency was signifi-
cant only among subjects who reported being uncomfortable
during the interaction.
Comparisons of the comfort one feels in interactions
with the physically disabled and nondisabled have shown the
expected tendency for less comfort to be reported when in-
teracting with the disabled (Kleck, 1966). Galvanic skin
response data corroborate this finding (Kleck, Ono, and
Hastorf, 1966). However, Farina and Ring (1965) found that
subjects reported being no less comfortable working with an
ex-patient than with a normal person.
Perceptions of the task performance of the two stigma-
tized groups have also failed to provide a picture of uni-
form reactions to the two groups. Farina and Ring (1965)
found that subjects who believed they were working with ex-
mental patients felt that their partners had hindered their
task performance, despite objective evidence to the con-
trary. Kleck (1969), on the other hand, found a nonsignif-
icant tendency for a disabled confederate's performance on
a Japanese paper folding task to be more favorably evaluated
than that of a non-disabled confederate.
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Farina, Holland, and Ring (1966) found that a confeder-
ate who described himself as emotionally disturbed was more
severely punished by subjects than a well-adjusted confeder-
ate. This finding was especially apparent on a measure of
the duration of shocks administered as corrective feedback
in a learning task. This measure was viewed by the authors
as a subtle indicator of negative affect, and evidence v;as
cited which suggested that subjects were quite unaware of
the duration of the shocks they administered. Farina,
Sherman, and Allen (1968) employed a similar procedure in a
study involving physically disabled confederates. Subjects
were found to deliver shocks of less duration to a severely
disabled confederate than to a confederate with only a
slight disability.
These findings provide further evidence that different
stigmata need not be perceived in the same way. The extent
to which the inconsistent results cited above were due to
differences in experimental situations as opposed to dif-
ferences in stigmata remains unclear. Attention will now
be directed toward other experimental findings regarding
the perception of the mentally ill.
Farina and Ring (1965) employed a number of measures
not yet discussed. Subjects rated the former mental patient
as less able to understand himself and others, less able to
get along with others, and more unpredictable than the normal
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partner. There were no differences in ratings of the
partner's intelligence or motor abilities.
A number of studies suggest that the way a mental
patient presents himself to others may have a strong impact
on their perception of him. Nunnally (1961) found that a
speaker who revealed herself to be an ex-mental patient
late in a speech was more effective in enhancing attitudes
toward the mentally ill than a speaker who revealed her ex-
patient status early in her speech. Gergen and Jones
(1963) found that a mentally ill person's unpredictable
behavior in a laboratory experiment had a deleterious ef-
fect on evaluations of him only when this unpredictability
.resulted in negative affective consequences (a loud buzz)
for the subject. Farina, Felner, and Boudreau (1973) in-
vestigated the hypothesis that tense and anxious behavior
on the part of a mental patient may be particularly disturb-
ing to others. Tense behavior on the part of a woman de-
scribed as an ex-patient applying for a job did produce less
favorable job recommendations than calm behavior. However,
a normal woman who behaved in an anxious manner received
equally negative recommendations.
A study by Farina, Holland, and Ring (1966) suggests
that the negative consequences of poor emotional adjustment
may be reduced when the present problem is attributed to
the past misdeeds of others. A confederate who described
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himself as poorly adjusted was less severely punished when
he described his childhood as pathogenic than when he de-
scribed his childhood as normal. For the currently well-
adjusted confederate, the bad childhood had the opposite
effect, with less severe punishment being inflicted in the
case of the normal childhood. The latter result was
neither expected nor satisfactorily explained.
Two of Farina's studies have examined the importance
of a person's belief that another person thinks he possesses
a stigma (regardless of whether he actually does) in affect-
ing the way he behaves and is perceived. In the first of
these studies (Farina, Allen, and Saul, 1968), one of two
subjects (the B subject) in each session was informed that,
as part of the experimental procedures, his partner (the
A subject) would be led to believe that he was 1) relatively
normal, 2) an overt homosexual, or 3) someone with a his-
tory of mental illness. In fact, the partner was always
given a "normal" description. Thus, any differences in the
way the B subject was perceived and treated would presum-
ably be due to changes in his own behavior.
Performance on the cooperative motor task employed was
about equal in the Normal and Homosexual conditions, but
significantly better in the Mental Illness condition. Addi-
tionally, B subjects in the Mental Illness group rated their
own task performance as more adequate than did the other
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two groups of B subjects. These findings suggested to the
authors that the subjects labeled mentally ill may have
worked extremely hard on the task and/or motivated their
partners to do likewise in order to prove that they were
not clumsy, a trait often associated with mental illness.
(Homosexual B subjects presumably could not disconfirm their
stigma by demonstrating their motoric abilities, since such
abilities are believed to be unrelated to homosexuality.)
Data on the participants' tendency to initiate and con-
tinue conversations revealed interesting effects. B sub-
jects did not differ on either of these measures. However,
A subjects in the Normal condition were more likely to ini-
tiate conversations with their partner than either of the
other groups of A subjects. Their total talking time was
also the greatest. It appears that an individual who be-
lieves himself to be discredited in the eyes of others may
provide relatively subtle cues which lead others to reject
him.
The second study of this nature (Farina, et al., 1971)
was an attempt to replicate some of the basic findings out-
lined above with a subject population possessing a genuine
stigma. Hospitalized mental patients were told that they
were in a study designed to determine whether people treat
mental patients differently from other human beings. Half
of the subjects were told that an interviewer had been led
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to believe that they were medical-surgical patients, and
half were told that the interviewer knew that they were
mental patients. The major findings of the study were that
subjects in the Medical
-Surgical condition talked somewhat
more (a marginal effect) and were rated by the confederate
interviewer as less tense and anxious than subjects in the
Mental Patient condition.
Experimental studies designed to investigate the pro-
cesses involved in perceiving the mentally ill have shown
these processes to be subtle and complex. "Obvious" pre-
dictions are not always supported, and unexpected findings
are common. The data accumulated thus far are not amenable
to easy interpretation. It is clear that much more empirical
work is needed in this area. Kleck's studies of physical
stigmata suggest several dependent measures which could
easily be incorporated in future research.
Kleck (1968) found that the motoric activity of sub-
jects interacting with a "disabled" other was more limited
than that of subjects interaction with a "normal" person.
Kleck, Ono, and Hastorf (1966) found that subjects inter-
acting with a person they believed to be handicapped dis-
torted their own opinions toward those they believed the
handicapped person would find more acceptable. The same
investigators found that subjects in the Handicap condi-
tion showed less variability in their answers to fixed-
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response items than subjects in the No Handicap condition.
The physical distance subjects choose to put between them-
selves and someone who is physically handicapped has been
examined in at least two studies (Kleck, 1969; Kleck, et al
1968). Both investigations found greater personal space
preferred in interactions with the handicapped. Comer and
Piliavin (1972) have studied the behavior of the physically
stigmatized person in the normal
-stigmatized interaction.
Physically handicapped subjects smiled less in the presence
of a normal interviewer than when with another handicapped
person. Subjects in the former condition terminated the
interaction sooner, showed greater motoric inhibition, and
maintained less eye contact than subjects in the latter
condition.
Experimental studies involving contact with the stig-
matized show considerable promise in helping to elucidate
the processes involved in perceiving the stigmatized. Such
studies offer several possible advantages over traditional
attitude surveys, two of which will be noted. First, it
is possible to investigate what happens during an interac-
tion between real people. The subject's perceptions are of
a real human being, rather than of someone identified ab-
stractly in a case description, or of someone identified
merely by a label such as "mental patient." Second, ex-
perimental studies allow the use of behavioral measures.
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Such measures, particularly subtle ones, may provide infor-
mation about such variables as anxiety, feelings of discom-
fort, and punitiveness which verbal reports do not tap.
Despite the potential advantages of experimental interac-
tion studies, one would certainly not want to recommend that
surveys of attitudes toward the mentally ill be abandoned.
Surveys offer advantages of their own, including the pos-
sibility of investigating a greater range of independent
and dependent variables, and their lower potential for dis-
torted findings due to extraneous factors.
While it is perhaps too soon to draw many specific
conclusions from the experimental interaction studies re-
viewed above, a number of general summary statements will
be offered. The tentative nature of even these general
conclusions should be emphasized.
First, the mentally ill are not indiscriminately con-
demned. It appears that the way they present themselves
to others has an important effect on how they are perceived,
as do other factors such as their past history and the con-
sequences their behavior produces for others.
The stigmatized person contributes to the "interac-
tion pathology" which is in evidence in normal-stigmatized
contacts. While evidence suggests that the behavior of the
normal participant is stereotyped and inhibited, the stig- •
matized person's behavior is not much different. It seems
39
reasonable to argue that the discomfort and awkwardness
each participant experiences help to enhance similar re-
actions within the other.
For reasons noted earlier, a comparison of reactions
to different stigmata is difficult. However, such evidence
as does exist is generally consistent with the proposition
that mental illness has, if anything, more devastating con-
sequences than several other stigmata which have been studied.
In general, then, the experimental studies provide some
additional information about public perceptions of the men-
tally ill, but do not substantially alter the conclusions
drawn earlier in our review of the survey literature. In
fact, the experimental findings are generally quite consis-
tent with the notion that a person identified as mentally
ill will be evaluated quite negatively by others.
Statement of the Problem
A great deal of evidence cited in our literature re-
view indicates that the mentally ill are viewed quite un-
favorably. However, little attention has been directed
tov/ard an examination of the cognitive processes which lead
to and sustain these negative views. In the present study
hypotheses are advanced concerning the types of inferences
one makes when he has limited knowledge about the behavior
of a person who has been diagnosed as mentally ill. A
relatively simple model of information-processing is em-
ployed to help explain how a perceiver might arrive at un-
charitable interpretations of the behavior of the mentally
ill. The proposed model is obviously not intended to pro-
vide a complete explanation of the development of the nega
tive public attitudes toward mental illness discussed in
our literature review. Rather, it is offered in order to
suggest one possible process by which certain information
about the mentally ill might lead a person to make differ-
ent inferences than the same information about a normal
person. The present study, then, investigates one aspect
of the larger issue of how attitudes toward the mentally
ill are developed and maintained.
In a more general sense, the study is concerned with
many of the same issues which are of interest to attribu-
tion theorists (Jones and Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967, 1973)
A fundamental concern of attribution theory is how a per-
ceiver goes about making causal inferences regarding an
actor's behavior. In Kelley 's (1967) view, an actor's re-
actions toward a particular entity may be attributed to
something about the entity (e.g., he liked the movie be-
cause it was a good movie), to something about the circum-
stances in which the behavior occurred (e.g., he liked it
because he saw it with an attractive woman), or to some-
thing about the actor (e.g., he liked the movie because he
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tends to like virtually an^^ movie), m Kelley's initial
statement of attribution theory (1967), a model was ad-
vanced in which the perceiver was depicted as behaving as
if a "naive scientist" in his attempts to make sense of his
world. Causal attributions were depicted as, for the most
part, rational conclusions about the nature of perceived
events. For example, if a reaction was found to be more or
less unique to a particular person and consistently asso-
ciated with him, the reaction would be attributed to the
person. In order to make a confident causal attribution,
a person needs a relatively large amount of information —
he needs to know about what types of reactions occur for
various combinations of persons, entities, times, and mo-
dalities. Some relevant information is often lacking, of
course, and attributions are frequently based on assumptions
about what one would find to be true if more complete data
were available. Thus, a perceiver might assume that an
actor's behavior in one situation is similar to his behavior
in other situations, that other people would behave differ-
ently in the actor's situation, etc. The present study
investigates the kinds of causal assumptions and infer-
ences we make about mentally ill and normal individuals
when we have minimal information about their behavior in
only a few situations.
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Kelley's (1971) paper on causal schemata and Jones and
Davis's (1965) paper on the inference of intentions and dis-
positions attempt to specify some of the factors which will
influence the kinds of assumptions the perceiver makes when
the information he has is relatively incomplete. While
certain aspects of these authors' arguments are consistent
with the model of information-processing investigated in
the present study, the theoretical rationale for the model
comes principally from Kanouse's (1971) recent studies of
language and attribution. Of particular relevance is his
work on the effects of different paths of inference on the
tendency to attribute causality to the person (i.e., to make
"general dispositional" inferences). This research will be
briefly reviewed before returning to our discussion of the
issues examined in the present study.
Kanouse has found that the tendency to agree with a
general dispositional interpretation of a person's behav-
ior depends on the intermediate inference one makes. In
one of Kanouse's studies subjects were given initial infor-
mation about a specific action of a hypothetical stimulus
person (e.g., "0 destroys Reader's Digests ."). Subjects
were then led to make one of two different intermediate
inferences. For some subjects the initial statement was
followed by a question designed to lead them to generalize
the action described to a larger object class (e.g., "Does
0 destroy magazines?"). For other subjects, the interme-
diate question included a subjective verb which helped to
explain the manifest action (e.g., "Does 0 hate Reader'
s
Digests?")
.
All subjects were then asked whether they
agreed with a general dispositional conclusion (e.g.,
"Does 0 hate magazines?"). To recap, subjects were experi-
mentally induced to follow one of two paths of inference,
and were then asked to indicate whether or not they agreed
with a conclusion which represented a reasonable termina-
tion for either path. In what Kanouse termed the "strong
path," the action was generalized to a larger object class
before being explained by invoking a subjective verb. In
the "weak path" the action was explained before being gen-
eralized. As might be evident from Kanouse' s choice of
terminology, the strong path consistently produced higher
agreement with the general conclusion than the weak path.
A number of related experiments have helped to eluci-
date the nature of the obtained path differences. Agree-
ment with the intermediate inference in the strong path
tended to be higher than agreement with the intermediate
inference in the weak path. However, analysis of covari-
ance showed that the obtained differential agreement with
the final conclusion reflected more than the operation of
an "agree" response set established in the Strong Path
condition.
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Path differences have been observed under conditions
differing somewhat from those in the example above. Kanouse
has summarized the major trends of his inferential path
studies by observing that " path differences occur when the
intermediate inferences in the two paths differ with respect
to their ability to explain or account for the initial evi -
dence sentence " (Kanouse, 1971, p. 141). When one inter-
mediate inference involves a description of a manifest ac-
tion and the other involves a subjective verb, as in the
example above, the differential explanatory power of the
intermediate inferences is apparent. Hating Reader'
s
Di-
Q^sts explains destroying them; destroying magazines does
not
.
In other cases, the relevance of Kanouse' s summary
statement is less obvious. Consider these two paths:
A. 0 tears up Reader ' s Digests .
Does O tear up magazines?
Does 0 destroy magazines? '
B. 0 tears up Reader ' s Digests .
Does 0 destroy Reader ' s Digests ?
Does O destroy magazines?
Path A yielded greater agreement with the conclusion than
Path B, even though both intermediate steps contain verbs
describing manifest actions. In examining situations of
this type, Kanouse found that, when both verbs were mani-
fest, path differences were obtained only when the direc-
tion of inference was from a specific verb to a more
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general one. It appears that specific actions may be ex-
plained by more general actions of the same class. Kanouse
argued that general actions often imply superordinate goals
which help account for particular behaviors designed to
reach those goals. Thus, destroying may explain tearing up
because one tears up in order to destroy. That is, "de-
stroy" and other general action verbs may contain more im-
plicit intentionality than specific action verbs like "tear
up."
The importance of intentionality was examined more
directly in a separate set of experimental conditions.
Some subjects were led to generalize an action to a larger
object class before explaining the action by invoking an
intention (in this case, the simple inference that the per-
son "wanted to" engage in the action). Other subjects ex-
plained the action by inferring intentionality before mak-
ing a generalization. Subjects in the first condition were
more likely than those in the second to agree with the con-
clusion that the person intended to behave in a certain
manner with respect to the larger object class (e.g., that
the person wanted to destroy magazines).
Kanouse 's work provides important evidence about some
conditions which appear to inhibit general dispositional
inferences. If a person explains a specific action by
invoking a feeling or intention before generalizing the
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action, he is less likely to make a general dispositional
inference about the actor than if the action is generalized
before being explained. Kanouse emphasizes the explanatory
power of verbs conveying implicit affect or intentionality
.
For present purposes, it should be noted that situational-*"
factors may also possess considerable explanatory power
(Kelley, 1967; 1973) and might be included within Kanouse's
system. It seems consistent with Kanouse's position, and
with Kelley' s more general statements of attribution theory,
to argue that inferring that a person has a disposition to
behave in a certain manner only in a certain type of situa-
tion will be likely to decrease the probability that the
action will be explained in general dispositional terms.
Incorporating situational explanations within Kanouse's
path model allows one to test its applicability to a wider
range of issues in social perception than would otherwise be
possible. The model seems to be most relevant to situations
in which one individual observes, or otherwise obtains re-
liable information about, another person engaging in a
The term "situational" is defined here in the same manner
as in Jones and Nisbett (1971). It refers to attributions
of causality to some aspect of the environment, and closely
corresponds to Kelley' s (1967) use of the term "external."
"Entity" and "circumstance" attributions are included within
the "external" category. Many situational explanations may
be viewed, as Kanouse points out, as relatively non-general
dispositional attributions (in the sense that a person has
a disposition to behave in a certain manner, but only under
limited conditions).
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specific action in a specific situation. if we assume that
the observer has limited information about the actor, and
that he is motivated to make sense of the actor's behavior,
it follows that the observer will use a sort of inductive
logic in an attempt to explain the behavior in question.
That is, the observer will make assumptions about the ac-
tor's behavior, intentions, and dispositions in unobserved
situations. Kanouse's path model suggests that if the ob-
server assumes that the actor behaves similarly in a wide
range of situations, he is likely to infer that the specif-
ic behavior he observes is due to a general disposition of
the actor. On the other hand, if the observer explains the
behavior in situational terms, he will be less likely to
attribute the actor's behavior to a general disposition.
The characteristics of an actor should have an impor-
tant effect on the assumptions and inferences an observer
makes. The possession of a stigmatizing condition such as
mental illness would seem to be of particular relevance.
For example, suppose that I observe a father threatening
to injure his son. If I believed the father to be a normal
person, it seems likely that I would be relatively charit-
able in my interpretation of his behavior. Perhaps I would
infer that the father had a bad day at work, or that the son
had behaved in a particularly mischievous way. However,
suppose that I had been informed that the father was once
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a patient in a mental hospital. A different "implicit per-
sonality theory" might well be employed in my interpreta-
tion of his behavior (Schneider, 1973). in this case I
would probably be more likely to infer that the father
threatened other people in other situations, which might
well lead me to infer a negative general disposition on his
part (e.g., that he is a dangerous person). If the behavior
in question were adaptive rather than maladaptive, my infer-
ences might well be reversed. Thus, I might be inclined to
attribute a normal person's gregariousness to his friendly
disposition, but to attribute the same behavior on the part
of a mental patient to situational factors.
The present research project views many attitudes and
beliefs regarding mental illness as general dispositional
inferences about the mentally ill person. Beliefs that a
person is unpredictable, dangerous, aggressive, or socially
inept are examples of undesirable dispositions which are
sometimes assigned to the mentally ill. The present line
of reasoning argues that the knowledge that a person has
been labeled mentally ill will lead an observer to make
different inferences than he would make in the absence of
this knowledge. The extent to which an observer accepts a
general dispositional interpretation of an actor's behavior
is hypothesized to depend on the type of mediating infer-
ence he makes. The mediating inference is, in turn,
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hypothesized to depend on the mental illness label and other
factors. The present research was designed to investigate
these and other contentions.
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METHOD
A two-part experiment was conducted in order to explore
the relevance of Kanouse's path model to the processes in-
volved in perceiving the behavior of the mentally ill.
Part I was a relatively straightforward test of the path
model. Part II was designed to provide additional informa-
tion relevant to the path model, and also to explore the
applicability of Wyer's (1970) more general subjective prob-
ability model to the present problem.
Overview of Part I
In Part I subjects were provided with brief descrip-
tions of four different individuals — a person exhibiting
neurotic symptoms who had been diagnosed as mentally ill, a
person exhibiting similar symptoms who had been diagnosed
as not mentally ill, a "normal" person who had been diag-
nosed as mentally ill, and another normal person who had
been diagnosed as not mentally ill. Following each descrip-
tion were two items describing the person's behavior in
2two different situations. In one of the situations the
person was described as engaging in a behavior which pre-
test subjects had judged to be indicative of mental health
For Control Path II subjects, no behavioral description was
given, as noted below.
(e.g., initiating a friendly conversation at a local base-
ball game). m the other situation the person's behavior
was maladaptive (e.g., throwing a temper tantrum when one's
in-laws were visiting). Each item included one or two prob-
ability measures derived from Kanouse's path model. Figures
1 and 2 help to clarify the four different paths which were
investigated.
generalization of ^general dispositionalbehavior to other explanation (B)
situations (G) ^
initial behavior' situational explana.
description (A) —tion for initial
behavior (E)
Figure 1. A representation of the version
of Kanouse's path model investigated in
the present research project.
Two principal paths corresponding to Kanouse's strong
and weak paths are of primary interest. The strong path
involves inferences from A to G to B, and the weak path
involves inferences from A to E to B. For both strong and
weak paths, the subjects were given A, the description of
the behavior performed in a particular situation. The
subjects were then asked to provide their estimates of
P(G) and P(E) in the Strong and Weak Path conditions, re-
spectively. Both groups gave their estimates of P(B).
Two control paths were also employed. in "Control Path I"
the subject was given A, and was asked for P(B). Control
Path I corresponds to what Kanouse terms a "direct infer-
ence." In Control Path II the subject was not given A,
and was simply asked for P(B). The two control paths were
included to help determine the extent to which agreement
with a general dispositional interpretation of the stimulus
person's behavior depends on being "led" through a particulaj
path of inference, and the extent to which such agreement
depends on knowledge about the stimulus person's initial be-
havior.
He throws temper
tantrums in a wide,
variety of situa-
tions (G)
He lacks self-control
-in a wide variety of
situations (B)
When his wife's ^
parents are visit-^
ing, he throws a
temper tantrum (A)
He lacks self-control
when his wife's parents
are visiting (E)
Figure 2. An illustrative example of the
inferential steps included in one mal-
adaptive behavior item.
The experimental design involved four fully crossed
independent variables. The four levels of the path vari-
able constituted the only between-groups variable. Three
within-sub jec variables (neurotic symptomatology vs.
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normality, diagnosis of mental illness vs. diagnosis of no
mental illness, and adaptive vs. maladaptive behavior) were
investigated.
Subjects
•
In selecting a subject population for our experiment,
practical considerations limited the choice to either col-
lege or high school students. College students have been
used extensively in previous survey and experimental studies
of attitudes toward the mentally ill. The general trend
of these studies is that college students express moderately
more favorable views than the general population (see, e.g.,
Olmsted and Durham, 1976). In recent years college psychol-
ogy courses have often included material on the effects
of labeling someone as mentally ill. The work of Szasz
(1961) and Rosenhan (1973), among others, has become rather
widely known on college campuses. Several studies cited by
Rabkin (1972) suggest that exposure to psychology courses
which deal with such issues results in more favorable atti-
tudes toward the mentally ill. In short, it appears likely
that many college students have been sensitized to some of
the principal issues investigated in our study, and that
they might not be appropriately naive with respect to our
experimental manipulations. Since it seemed more likely
that high school students would meet the criterion of
experimental naivete, the high school population was se-
lected.
A total of 91 high school students served as subjects
in the study. The students took part in the experiment dur-
ing regular meetings of their social science courses. The'
subjects were run in groups of 12, 21, 14, 35, and 9. Each
subject was randomly assigned to one of the 4 Path condi-
tions using a randomization within blocks procedure, result-
ing in an initial distribution of 22 subjects in the Control
Path II condition and 23 subjects in each of the other Path
conditions. However, 8 subjects' questionnaires were not
completed appropriately, and their data were not used in
the analyses reported in this paper.
After this subject loss, 23 subjects remained in the
Weak Path condition, and 20 subjects in each other Path con-
dition. Forty-nine females and 34 males were included in
the final sample. The sex distribution within each Path
condition was roughly proportional to that of the total
sample. The subjects ranged in age from 14 to 20, with the
vast majority (78) being 15, 16, or 17.
Construction of the Questionnaire
As indicated above, a given subject made judgments
using only one type of path. All subjects received the fol-
lowing written instructions:
This questionnaire is designed to investigate thekinds of preaictions people make about how differ-
ent types of people are likely to behave in differ-
ent situations. You will be given a small amount
of information about four different individuals
and will be asked to make predictions about theirbehavior on the basis of this information. All ofthe individuals described have recently had their
mental health evaluated by mental health profes-
sionals, and each description will include a brief
summary statement about the results of that evalu-
ation. In addition, other information about theperson's interests, job, family, personal problems,
etc. will be provided. Following the general in-formation about the person, you will be given a
statement about his behavior in one situation.
(For Control Path II subjects, the preceding sen-
tence was omitted.) Use all of the information
which you have been given in responding to the
questions which follow each person's description.
Answer each question by marking the point on the
scale which best represents your judgment. Be
sure to respond on the basis of what you honestly
believe about the person, rather than what you
think you should believe or what you think the
experimenter expects you to say.
Each subject, as noted above, made predictions about the be-
havior of four different stimulus persons. The descriptions
of the stimulus persons included information designed to
manipulate the mental illness variable, and additional in-
formation designed to manipulate the neurotic symptomatol-
ogy variable. The mental illness variable was manipulated
by simply indicating that the stimulus person had recently
been diagnosed as mentally ill, or as not mentally ill.
"Neurotic" descriptions indicated that the person mani-
fested symptoms which have been traditionally associated
with a neurotic diagnosis (see, e.g.. Diagnostic and Statis -
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tical Manual, American Psychiatric Association, 1968).
"Normal" descriptions included information about the per-
son's job, interests, etc. A sample description of a stimu-
lus person (in the neurotic symptoms / not mentally ill con-
dition) is given below.
Harold T. was recently diagnosed as not mentally
ill. He becomes very fearful whenever he thinks
about being in a tall building, near the top of
a mountain, or even at the top of a long ladder.
He believes that his fear of heights is basically
irrational, but that only seems to make the in-
tense anxiety he experiences harder to accept.
Following the description of a stimulus person, all subjects
except those in the Control Path II condition received in-
formation about the person's behavior in one situation, fol-
lowed by one or two probability measures. An example of an
"item" (defined here as the description of the specific be-
havior in one situation and the probability judgment or
judgments relevant to that behavioral description) for Strong
Path subjects follows:
He throws a temper tantrum when his wife's parents are visit-
ing.
How likely is it that he throws temper tantrums in a wide
variety of situations?
I [ I I I I I I \ L_J
extremely very somewhat somewhat very extremely
unlikely unlikely unlikely likely likely likely
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of situations?
How likely is it that he lacks self-control in a wide-variety
extremely very somewhat
unlikely unlikely unlikely
somewhat
likely
very
likely
extremely
likely
Each subject received one maladaptive behavior item and one
adaptive behavior item for each stimulus person. All prob-
ability judgments were made on 11-point scales like those
above. Subjective probability estimates were obtained by a
signing the values 0, .1, .2, etc. to the 11 points of the
A pretest was conducted in order to insure that the adap-
tive vs. maladaptive behavior variable was manipulated appro-
priately. Twenty subjects rated a pool of 48 initial behav-
ior descriptions (corresponding to "A" in the path model)
on 7-point scales ranging from "mentally unhealthy" (1 on
the scale) to "mentally healthy." All of the eight items
selected as "adaptive" were in the top one-third of the dis-
tribution of mean responses to the 48 items. Six of the
eight maladaptive items received mean ratings in the bottom
one-third of the distribution, and the remaining two were
below the overall median. The eight adaptive items received
an average rating of 5.54, and the eight maladaptive items
received an average rating of 2.79.
It was also necessary to insure that the items were
written in a manner that corresponds to certain assumptions
scale.
*".
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of the path model. For example, the weak path is presumed
to be weak because its mediating inference, E, provides a
relatively good explanation for A. Since E explains A,
the mediating inference completes the path and makes infer-
ring B unnecessary. On the other hand, in the strong path,
the mediating inference G is assumed to offer a rather in-
adequate explanation for A, making the B inference neces-
sary to complete the path. Thus, the model assumes that E
provides a better explanation for A than G provides.
However, E should not be written in a manner which allows
one to interpret it as a very general sort of explanation,
i.e., one which explains G as well as A quite satisfactorily.
If E were interpreted in such a general way, it could be
viewed as functionally equivalent to B. In such a situation,
E might well stop the chain of inference in the weak path as
predicted, but for an unintended reason. Hence, E should be
considered a good explanation for A, but a poor explanation
for G.
A second pretest was conducted in order to select items
which were interpreted as intended. A separate sample of
28 subjects rated 24 items on the basis of how well the dif-
ferent inferential steps explained each other. For each
item, subjects indicated how well E explained A, how well
G explained A, and how well E explained G on 5-point scales.
Two criteria were used in selecting items. First, E had to
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explain A better than it explained G. For all 16 items se-
lected, E was viewed as a more satisfactory explanation for
A than for G (p< .05 by one-tailed t-test for correlated ob-
servations in each case, p < .005 for 14 of 16 comparisons).
Second, E had to be viewed as superior to G as an explana-
tion for A. For 15 of the 16 items selected, E was rated
as a significantly better explanation (p<.025 in each case).
For the remaining item, E and G were considered equally ade-
quate explanations.
As indicated, eight adaptive and eight maladaptive behav-
ior items constituted the final pool of items to be used in
the study. This relatively large number of items was in-
cluded to minimize the probability that the results obtained
would be due to idiosyncratic features of the particular mal-
adaptive and adaptive behavior items selected. Following
the same reasoning, six neurotic and six normal descriptions
were devised. All of the items and descriptions used in the
experiment are included in the Appendices.
The specific descriptions and items appearing on a ver-
sion of the questionnaire were selected randomly from the
larger groups. The order in which stimulus persons appeared
on the questionnaire was randomized for each subject sep-
arately, as was the order of the two items following each
stimulus person's description. Following this procedure, a
separate version of tne questionnaire was created for each
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subject. No item or description appeared more than once
on a single version of the questionnaire and, overall, all
items and descriptions appeared with approximately equal fre-
quency.
Administration of the Questionnaire
As noted previously, subjects completed the question-
naire during regularly scheduled meetings of their social
science courses. At the beginning of the class period the
course instructor introduced the experimenter very briefly
and reminded the students that they would be doing "something
a little different" in their class that day. The experiment-
er then indicated that he was involved in a research project
at the University of Massachusetts, and that he would appre-
ciate their assistance with his research. He indicated
that he would tell them a little about the research project
that day, and that he would return to discuss it more fully,
including the data they would provide, in approximately three
months
.
The experimenter then said that he was generally inter-
ested in the kinds of predictions people make about the behav
ior of other people. The subjects were asked to fill out
two questionnaires, the first of which was relatively short
and the second of which was somewhat longer. (The second
questionnaire was used to obtain the data for Part II of the
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experiment, and is discussed below.) The experimenter then
explained that they would be asked to make some judgments
on probability scales, with which some of them might not
be familiar. He then proceeded to the blackboard and demon-
strated how a weatherman's predictions about the likelihood
of rain would be represented on the type of scale used in
the experiment. The experimenter then indicated that the
students might find that some of the judgments they would
be asked to make would be rather easy for them, while others
might be very difficult. They were asked to make the best
judgments possible on the basis of the information provided.
All subjects were asked to read the written instruc-
tions on the first questionnaire, and were encouraged to ask
questions if anything was unclear to them. The experimenter
then indicated that the students could bring their first
questionnaire up to his desk when finished. At that time
they could obtain the second questionnaire and complete it
after reading the written instructions it contained. It
was emphasized that it was important to obtain a second
questionnaire containing the same subject number as the
first so that the experimenter could keep his records
straight.
The administration of both questionnaires took about 35
minutes. When all subjects had completed both question-
naires, the experimenter thanked them again for their help
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with his research project and reminded them that he would be
back to discuss the research more thoroughly when most of
the data had been analyzed.
Hypotheses
Several hypotheses were advanced. Overall, the strong
path should yield greater agreement with the general disposi-
tional inference than any of the other paths. Among subjects
in the Strong Path condition, making the intermediate infer-
ence should lead to greater agreement with the final infer-
ence; hence, P(G) and P(B) should be positively correlated.
Among Weak Path subjects, making the intermediate inference
should inhibit the tendency to make the general dispositional
inference; hence, P(E) and P(B) should show a negative rela-
tionship.
Our review of the literature on attitudes toward the
mentally ill shows that the mencal illness label typically
has a powerful effect on attitudes, while the existence of
relatively mild psychiatric symptoms is not particularly
disturbing to people. In the present study the two variables
were manipulated orthogonally. The mental illness label is
hypothesized to have a strong effect on the tendency to make
both mediating and general dispositional inferences. Sub-
jects should be more inclined to generalize the maladaptive
behavior of mentally ill stimulus persons to unobserved
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situations than the same behavior performed by persons who
are not mentally ill. This should lead to stronger disposi-
tional attributions when the actor is mentally ill. on the
other hand, the adaptive behavior of the mentally ill should
be undergeneralized relative to that of the not mentally ill
and should result in weaker dispositional inferences. Situa
tional explanations for adaptive behavior should be more
readily accepted when the stimulus person is mentally ill,
and situational explanations for maladaptive behavior should
be more readily accepted when the stimulus person is not
mentally ill.
Predictions regarding the effects of the neurotic symp-
tomatology variable are less easily made. Previous research
suggests that this variable should have little effect. How-
ever, it also seems plausible to argue that the inferential
tendencies subjects exhibit when making judgments about the
mentally ill should be enhanced when the person identified a
mentally ill displays symptoms which may be interpreted as
manifestations of his mental problems. Because there seems
to be no a^ priori way of determining which of these two pre-
dictions is more appropriate in the present context, no
specific hypotheses about the effects of the neurotic symp-
tomatology variable are offered.
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Overview of Part II
The second part of the experiment was conducted in order
to examine several issues related to those investigated in
Part I. In the second questionnaire subjects were asked for
their estimates of four conditional probabilities: P(b|G),
P(bIg'), P(bIe), and P(b|e'). The inclusion of these mea-
sures allows a more comprehensive examination of the infer-
ence process proposed in Part I. For example, in Part I it
was argued that general dispositional inferences are likely
when a specific behavior is generalized to unobserved situa-
tions. However, it is also possible that general disposi-
tional inferences are made even when the perceiver infers that
the actor does not behave similarly in other situations.
Stated more generally, the issue of the contribution of the
intermediate inference to the final inference in a path may
be addressed by examining the conditional probability esti-
mates obtained in Part II.
In addition, the conditional estimates provide a further
test of the relative strength of the strong and weak paths.
In Part I subjects in the Strong Path and Weak Path condi-
tions were, in effect, led through structured paths of in-
ference, but they were free to accept or reject the infer-
ences offered. In Part II the subjects were asked to esti-
mate P(B) assuming that G or E, the intermediate inference,
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was valid. These judgments allow a comparison of the power
of the strong and weak paths to produce agreement with a
general dispositional conclusion when their respective me-
diating inferences are accepted with a probability approach-
ing unity.
The second experiment was also intended to explore the
relevance of Wyer's (1970) subjective probability model to
the present research topic. Wyer (1970; Wyer and Goldberg,
1970) has proposed that subjective probabilities combine in
a manner predictable from the laws of objective probability,
and he has recently reviewed a large body of research rele-
vant to this general contention (Wyer, 1974), Wyer's own
conditional probability model has proven to be among the most
useful mathematical models tested. The model has been ad-
vanced as a general one which describes the nature of rela-
tionships among cognitions. It has been applied across
several content areas, and has implications for a variety
of social perception and attitude change phenomena. The
model has been shown to generate very accurate quantitative
predictions regarding experimentally created beliefs about
hypothetical stimulus persons, and fairly accurate predic-
tions regarding previously formed beliefs about real objects
and events.
It is of interest, then, to examine how V/yer's model
applies to the judgments of subjects in the present study.
If one assumes that subjects accept the initial behavior
description as given [i.e., P(A) = 1], then two equations
of relevance to the inferential path model investigated in
the present study may be proposed. They are as follows:
1) P(B) = P(G)P(B|G) + P(G')P(B|G')
2) P(B) = P(E)P(B|E) + P(E')P(B|E')
Part II included a test of the predictive validity of these
two equations.
Procedure
As indicated previously, subjects completed the ques-
tionnaire for Part II of the experiment immediately after
completing the first questionnaire. The written instructions
appearing on the second questionnaire were the following:
This questionnaire is very similar to the first
one you filled out. You will again be given
descriptions of four individuals, and statements
about their behavior in certain situations will
be provided. Some of the judgments you are asked
to make are very much like those on the first
questionnaire; others are somewhat different.
Some items ask for judgments about the likelihood
of certain events if something else is true (e.g.,
items of the form, "If he gets a good job, how
likely is it that he will buy a new car?"). As
in the first questionnaire, respond to each item
by marking the point on the scale which best
represents your judgment. Although some of the
judgments you are asked to make may appear quite
similar, each one is, in fact, somewhat different
from all others. All items should be read care-
fully, and should be answered in the order in
which they appear.
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In order to facilitate a comparison of the data obtained in
Parts I and II, all subjects received the same four descrip-
tions of stimulus persons which they received in Part I, and
the same behavior items. All subjects received A, the ini-
tial behavior description, in Part II. Following each item
subjects were asked to estimate these probabilities: P(B),
P(G), P(E), P(B|G), P(b|G'), P(B|E), and P(B|EM. The judg-
ments were made in the order above, using the same type of
11-point scales employed in Part I. Again, subjective prob-
ability values were obtained by assigning the values 0, .1,
.2, etc. to the 11 points of the scale. Estimates of P(G*
)
and P(E') were obtained by simply solving the equations
P(G«) = 1 - P(G) and P(E') = 1 - P(E). To clarify the nature
of the data obtained in the second part of the experiment,
the specific probability judgments made in Part II for the
maladaptive behavior item described in our discussion of
Part I are shown in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
Probability Judgments for One
Maladaptive Behavior Item
JUDGMENTS QUESTION
A (given) When his wife's parents are visiting, he
throws a temper tantrum. (statement given)
P(B) How likely is it that he lacks self-controlin a wide variety of situations?
P(G) How likely is it that he throws temper tan-trums in a wide variety of situations?
P(E) How likely is it that he lacks self-control
when his wife's parents are visiting?
P(B|G)
If he throws temper tantrums in a wide
variety of situations, how likely is it that
he lacks self-control in a wide variety of
situations?
P(B|G' )
If he does not throw temper tantrums in a
wide variety of situations, how likely is
it that he lacks self-control in a wide
variety of situations?
p(b|e)
If he lacks self-control when his wife's
parents are visiting, how likely is it
that he lacks self-control in a wide variety
of situations?
p(b|e» )
If he does not lack self-control when his
wife's parents are visiting, how likely is
it that he lacks self-control in a wide
variety of situations?
RESULTS
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Part I
Probability of B. in order to examine the effects of
the independent variables on estimates of the probability of
B, a 4 (path of inference) X 2 (adaptive vs. maladaptive be-
havior) X 2 (diagnosis of mental illness vs. diagnosis of no
mental illness) X 2 (neurotic symptomatology vs. normal symp-
tomatology) analysis of variance was conducted.^ The Path
variable was a between-groups factor, while the other three
variables were wi thin-subjects factors. In the remainder
of this paper the variables will be referred to as Path,
Adaptiveness
,
Diagnosis, and Symptoms.
The analysis of variance (summarized in Table 2) revealed
several effects. First, a Path main effect was obtained.
Multiple comparisons of the overall means for the four Path
conditions showed that probability estimates were highest
among subjects in the Control Path I condition. Their over-
all estimate of the likelihood of B, a general dispositional
interpretation of the stimulus person's behavior, was .624,
Initially, the analyses of variance reported in this paper
included sex of the subject as an independent variable.
Since this variable had little effect on any of the depend-
ent variables, the data were collapsed across this variable.
The few significant affects involving sex are presented in
Appendix C.
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TABLE 2
Analysis of Variance Summary Table:
Estimates of P(B)
Source df Mean Sauarf^ r
Mean 1 20200.89
Path ( P
)
3 54.53 9.27**
Error 79 5.88
Adaptiveness (A) 1 43.21 7.26*
AP 3 1.14 .19
Error 79 5.95
Symptoms (S) 1
.11 .03
SP 3 .73 .21
Error 79 3.48
AS 1 75.11 13. 51**
AoF 3 22.58 4.06*
Error 79 5.56
Diagnosis (D) 1 1.08 .33
DP 3
Error 79 3.31
AD 1 6.02 1.23
ADP 3 .32 .07
Error 79 4.89
SD 1 2.70 .68
SDP 3 4.36 1.10
Error 79 3.98
ASD 1 .51 .09
ASDP 3 4.72 .82
Error 79 5.79
•p < .01
,
••p < .001
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which differed significantly from each of the other means/
These means were
.543, .560, and .483, for the Strong, Weak,
and Control Path II conditions, respectively. The only other
significant comparison of means indicated that Weak Path sub-
jects' estimates of P(B) were higher than those of subjects
in the Control Path II condition.
As one might expect, subjects who were provided with no
description of a person's initial behavior in one situation
(Control Path II subjects) were unlikely to make a general
dispositional attribution about the person. However, unex-
pectedly, the introduction of information about a person's
behavior in one situation resulted in stronger dispositional
attributions than in any other Path condition. It is also of
interest to note that, contrary to our prediction. Strong
Path subjects' estimates of P(B) were no higher than those of
Weak Path subjects.
The Adaptiveness main effect indicates that, overall,
subjects were more likely to interpret adaptive behavior as
reflecting a general disposition than maladaptive behavior.
In order to clarify the nature of the obtained Adaptiveness
X Symptoms X Path interaction, tests of the simple interaction
of Adaptiveness and Symptoms were conducted separately
Unless otherwise indicated, all multiple and individual com-
parisons of means reported in this paper are based on the
Tukey B test (Winer, 1962), employing an alpha level of .05.
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for each path. These analyses revealed that the only signif-
icant Adaptiveness X Symptoms interaction occurred in the
Control Path II condition. it should be re-emphasized that
Control Path II subjects did not receive the initial behavior
descriptions and, hence, the Adaptiveness manipulation for
them involved essentially a description of a positive or nega
tive disposition. The interaction may be viewed as an indi-
cation of how subjects tend to attribute positive and nega-
tive dispositions as a function of the type of symptoms a
stimulus person manifests. Multiple comparisons revealed
that positive dispositions were more strongly attributed when
the person's symptoms were normal than when his symptoms were
neurotic in nature. Stronger attributions of negative dis-
positions occurred when neurotic symptoms were exhibited.
The means for this interaction are shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Mean Estimates of P(B) for Adaptiveness X Symptoms
Interaction among Control Path II Subjects
SYMPTOMS
ADAPTIVENESS
Adaptive Maladaptive
Neurotic .425 (a) .535 (b)
Normal .600 (c) .370 (d)
significant individual comparisons: a vs. c,
b vs. d, c vs. d
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Intermediate Inferences. It was important to determine
whether the two Path conditions involving intermediate steps
differed with respect to the strength of their intermediate
inferences. Kanouse had found that subjects were more likely
to agree with the intermediate inference in his strong path
than with the intermediate inference in his weak path. In
the present study, as in Kanouse' s work, it was desirable to
rule out the possibility that any effects of Path on estimates
of P(B) might be due to an "agree" response set produced by
unintentionally creating stronger intermediate inferences in
one path.
In order to evaluate the possibility that Strong Path
subjects' estimates of P(G) might differ from Weak Path sub-
jects' estimates of P(E), and to examine the effects of the
other independent variables on these intermediate inferences,
an analysis of variance was performed. Strong Path subjects'
estimates of P(G) and Weak Path subjects' estimates of P(E)
were treated as a single dependent variable, "intermediate
inference." The Path variable was a between-groups independ-
ent variable, and Adaptiveness
,
Symptoms, and Diagnosis were
wi thin-sub jects variables. The only significant effect ob-
tained in this analysis was a Path main effect (F = 8.48,
df = 1, 41, p <.01). For Strong Path subjects, the overall
estimate of P(G), a generalization of the initial behavior
to unobserved situations, was ,504. Weak Path subjects'
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overall estimate of P(E), an explanation of the initial be-
havior in rather specific terms, was .614. This effect is
in the opposite direction to that obtained by Kanouse.
Relationships between Intermediate and Final Inferences
.
It was anticipated that making the intermediate inference in
the Strong Path would facilitate making the final inference;
thus P(G) and P(B) were predicted to be positively correlat-
ed. On the other hand, inferring E was hypothesized to re-
duce the probability of inferring B; thus P(E) and P(B) were
expected to be negatively correlated. As noted previously,
an individual subject made probability estimates for a total
of eight different stimulus combinations (e.g., one "stimulus
combination" would be a person exhibiting neurotic symptoms
who had been diagnosed as not mentally ill engaging in an
adaptive behavior). Thus it was possible to compute the cor-
relation between the intermediate and final inferences sep-
arately for each different stimulus combination. These corre-
lations, for both the Strong and Weak Path conditions, are
presented in Table 4 and 5. As is evident from the tables,
all of the obtained correlations were positive. Three of the
eight correlations for Strong Path subjects were significant,
while six of the Weak Path Correlations were significant.
In addition to these correlations, a correlation between
a subject's average (mean for eight stimulus combinations)
estimates of the intermediate and final inferences was com-
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TABLE 4
Correlations between Estimates of P(G) and P(B)
among Strong Path Subjects
ADAPTIVENESS DIAGNOSIS
SYMPTOMS
Neurotic Normal
Adaptive
Mental ly
111 .639** .430
Not
Mentally 111 .354 .551*
Maladaptive
Mental ly
111 .305 .474*
Not
Mentally 111 .424 .139
•p< .05, ••p< .01, df = 18 for each correlation
TABLE 5
Correlations between Estimates of P(E) and P(B)
among Weak Path Subjects
ADAPTIVENESS DIAGNOSIS
SYMPTOMS
Neurotic Normal
Adaptive
Mental ly
111 .276
.537*»
Not
Mentally 111 .322
.715**
Maladaptive
Mental ly
111
.739»* .469**
Not
Mentally 111
.489* .558**
p< .05, **p< .01, df = 21 for each correlation
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puted for each Path condition. The obtained correlation co-
efficients were .808 (p< .01, df = 18) for Strong Path sub-
jects and
.599 (p< .01, df = 21) for Weak Path subjects.
These two correlations were compared using the r-to-Z trans-
formation (Hays, 1963), and were found to not differ signif-
icantly. In addition, for each stimulus combination, the
Strong and Weak Path correlations were compared using this
statistical test. None of the eight comparisons was signif-
icant. In general, these correlational data suggest that
the intermediate inferences in both paths tend to facilitate
the final inference.
Analysis of Covariance
. Since both P(G) and P(E) were
found to be correlated with P(B), and since the overall esti-
mate of P(E) was higher than that of P(G), an analysis of
covariance was conducted in order to examine the effects of
the independent variables on P(B) after equating the strength
of the intermediate inferences in the Strong and Weak Paths. ^
In this analysis. Path was a between-groups variable, and
Adaptiveness
,
Symptoms, and Diagnosis were within-sub jects
variables. The intermediate inference was the covariate.
Evans and Anastasio (1968) have proposed that analysis of
covariance is not appropriate when a treatment has an effect
on the covariate. Others (e.g., Sprott, 1970; Myers, 1972)
have suggested that the technique is still appropriate, but
that extreme care must be used in interpreting the results of
such an analysis. Since Path did have an effect on the prob-
ability of an intermediate inference, the results of the pres-
ent analysis v/ere interpreted quite cautiously.
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and P(B) was the dependent variable. This analysis revealed
only one significant effect, a Path X Symptoms X Diagnosis
interaction. The adjusted means for this interaction are
shown in Table 6. The pattern of means suggests that Strong
Path subjects were somewhat more likely to attribute behavior
to a general disposition of the actor when the actor's symp-
toms and diagnosis were consistent.
TABLE 6
Adjusted Mean Estimates of P(B) for Path X
Symptoms X Diagnosis Interaction
PATH DIAGNOSIS
SYMPTOMS
Neurotic Normal
Strong
Mentally 111 .605 .550
Not
Mentally 111 .543 .602
Weak
Mentally 111 .559 .527
Not
Mentally 111 .543 .554
The adjusted overall means for the two Path conditions
differed only slightly from those obtained in the original
analysis of variance. The Strong Path adjusted mean was .569,
and that for the Weak Path was .538. These two values did
not differ significantly (F = 2.57, df = 1, 40, p>.10).
Thus, the fact that the two paths did not elicit differential
estimates of P(B) does not appear to be attributable to the
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difference in the strength of their intermediate inferences.
The other differences between the results of the ini-
tial analysis of variance and the analysis of covariance are
inconsequential. The covariance analysis did not yield a
significant Adaptiveness main effect, nor a significant
Adaptiveness X Symptoms interaction. However, it should be
recalled that the only significant simple Adaptiveness X
Symptoms interaction effect occurred in the Control Path II
condition. The covariance results, of course, have no
bearing on this finding.
Path II
In Part II all subjects were exposed to equivalent stim-
uli, regardless of their Path condition in Part I. Each
subject received the same descriptions of stimulus persons
as he received in Part I, and was exposed to the same eight
behavior descriptions. [As discussed previously, the initial
behavior descriptions (A) were not received by Control Path
II subjects in Part I.] In Part II all subjects received A,
the description of the person's initial behavior. For each
item, the subjects made seven probability judgments, in the
following order: P(B), P(G), P(E), P(B|G), P(B|G'), P(B|E),
and P(b|E'). It may be helpful to refer to the specific
probability judgments made for one maladaptive behavior item,
provided in Table 1.
79
Since the Path variable was not manipulated in Part II,
any effects it had on these probability estimates may be at-
tributed to carry-over effects from Part I. A 4 (Path) X
2 (Adaptiveness) X 2 (Symptoms) X 2 (Diagnosis) analysis of
variance was performed for each of the seven probability
judgments. As in Part I Path was a between-groups variable
and the other three variables were within-sub jects variables.
P(B)
. The analysis of variance for P(B) revealed two
main effects. A main effect for Adaptiveness (F = 19.13, df =
1,79, p<.001) showed that general dispositional interpreta-
tions of adaptive behavior were more likely than general dis-
positional interpretations of maladaptive behavior. A Path
main effect (F = 3.44, df = 3,79, p<.025) was also obtained.
Overall estimates of P(B) were .548, .592, .640, and .636
for the Strong, Weak, Control I, and Control II conditions,
respectively. Multiple comparisons of these means revealed
only two significant difference's. The Strong Path mean was
lower than either of the Control Path means. It may be noted
that this general array of means is similar to that obtained
in Part I, with the exception of the Control Path II mean,
which is substantially higher. This increase appears to be
due to the fact that Control Path II subjects were, unlike
the other groups, exposed to A, the initial behavior descrip-
tion, for the first time in Part II. Taken together with the
results obtained in i'art I, the effects of Path on P(B) in
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Part II suggest that exposure to a path involving an inter-
mediate inference may inhibit one's tendency to interpret
behavior in general dispositional terms.
In addition to the two main effects discussed above, an
Adaptiveness X Symptoms interaction was obtained (F = 5.34,
df = 1,79, p< .025). The means for this interaction are
presented in Table 7. Multiple comparisons of these means
showed that when a stimulus person exhibited neurotic symp-
toms, subjects were inclined to attribute both his adaptive
and maladaptive behavior to a general disposition on his
part. However, when the person's symptoms were normal,
general dispositional interpretations were much less likely
when the behavior he engaged in was maladaptive.
TABLE. 7
Mean Estimates of P(B) for Adaptiveness X
Symptoms Interaction
SYMPTOMS
ADAPTIVENESS
Adaptive Maladaptive
Neurotic .624 (a) .592 (b)
^
Normal .649 (c) .551 (d)
significant individual comparisons: a vs. d,
b vs. c, c vs. d
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£(£)_. The analysis of variance of estimates of P(G)
revealed only one significant effect. An Adaptiveness main
effect (F = 9.94, df = 1,79, p<.005) showed that estimates
of P(G) were higher when the behavior the stimulus person
engaged in was adaptive.
The Adaptiveness X Diagnosis interaction did not reach
significance (F = 3.28, df = 1,79, p<.08), but is of particu-
lar theoretical interest and warrants further discussion.
The means for this interaction are presented in Table 8. The
Tukey B multiple comparison technique revealed three signifi-
cant differences. The mean for the maladaptive / not mentally
ill cell was lower than the other three means. Subjects were
relatively unlikely to say that the maladaptive behavior of a
person who had been diagnosed as not mentally ill would gen-
eralize to other situations.
TABLE 8
Mean Estimates of P(G) for Adaptiveness X
Diagnosis Interaction
DIAGNOSIS
ADAPTIVENESS
Adaptive Mai adapt ive
Mentally
111 .577 (a) .556 (b)
Not
Mental ly .576 (c) .509 (d)
111
significant individual comparisons: a vs. d,
b vs. d, c vs. d
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TABLE 9
Analysis of Variance Summary Table:
Estimates of P(E)
Source df Mean Square F
Mean 1 27894.23
ra t n V r
/
3 46.83 5.89*
Error 79 7.95
Adaptiveness (A) 1 33.69 10. 12**
Ar 3 1 .84 .55
Error 79 3.33
Symptoms 1 .08 .02
C Dor 3 2.06 • 56
Error 79 3.65
AS 1 2.71 1.02
A c nAbr 6 .08
Error 79 2.66
Diagnosis (D) 1 11.47 3.56
np J 1 AQ1 .
Error 79 3.22
AD 1 13.85 4.99*
ADP 3 .51 .18
Error 79 2.78
SD 1 .43 .17
SDP 3 .90 .36
Error 79 2.50
ASD 1 2.23 .89
ASDP 3 4.24 1.70
Error 79 2.50
•p < .05, ••p < .005, •*p < .001
P(E) . The summary table for the P(E) analysis of variance
is presented in Table 9. An Adaptiveness main effect was
again obtained. Estimates of the probability of E, a rather
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specific explanation of the stimulus person's initial behav-
ior, were higher when the behavior engaged in was adaptive
rather than maladaptive. A main effect of Path was also ob-
tained. The means for the Strong Path, Weak Path, Control
Path I, and Control Path II conditions were
.593, .626,
.719, and .660, respectively. The Control Path I mean was
significantly higher than either the Strong or Weak Path
means.
The means for the Adaptiveness X Diagnosis interaction
are shown in Table 10. The significant interaction term is
attributable to the low mean in the maladaptive / mentally
ill cell. Subjects were relatively unlikely to accept a spe-
cific, situational explanation for the maladaptive behavior
of a person diagnosed as mentally ill.
TABLE 10
Mean Estimates of P(E) for Adaptiveness X
Diagnosis Interaction
DIAGNOSIS
ADAPTIVENESS
Adaptive Maladaptive
Mental ly
111 .672 (a) .598 (b)
Not
Mental ly .671 (c) .654 (d)
111
significant individual comparisons: a vs. b,
b vs. c, b vs. d
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TABLE 11
Analysis of Variance Summary Table:
Estimates of P(b|g)
Source df Mean Square F
Mean 1
Path (P) 3 22.62 2.41
Error 79 9.39
Adaptiveness (A) 1
AP 3 .50 .18
Error 79 2.85
Symptoms (S) 1 5 1 1
SP 3 .56 .21
Error 79 2.62
AS 1 5.45 1-88
ASP 3 1.06 .37
Error 79 2.90
Diagnosis (D) 1 12.16 3.66
DP 3 7.50 2.26
Error 3.32
AD 1 2.10 .77
ADP 3 2.14 .78
Error 79 2.74
SD 1 24.07 8.54*
SDP 3 15.93 5.65**
Error 79 2.82
ASD 1 1.14 .42
ASDP 3 1.47 .54
Error 79 2.71
•p < .005, •*p < .001
P(b|G) . The analysis of variance of subjects' estimates
of P(B|G), the probability of B given that G is true, is sum-
marized in Table 11. Again, an Adaptiveness main effect was
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obtained. Estimates of P(B|G) were higher when the person's
behavior was adaptive than when it was maladaptive.
A proper interpretation of the overall Symptoms X Diag-
nosis interaction depends on a careful analysis of the three-
way Path X Symptoms X Diagnosis interaction. The means for
both the three-way interaction and the overall two-way inter-
action are presented in Table 12. Multiple comparisons of
the means for the two-way interaction revealed that the nor-
mal / not mentally ill mean was significantly higher than any
of the other three means.
An examination of the simple Symptoms X Diagnosis in-
teractions at each level of the Path variable revealed two
significant interaction terms, for Control Path I subjects
(F = 11.95, df = 1,19, p< .005) and for Control Path II sub-
jects (F = 5.42, df = 1,19, p< .05). Multiple comparisons
suggest that each of these interactions is due to an elevated
mean in the normal / not mentally ill cell.
The significant overall Symptoms X Diagnosis interaction
is traceable, then, to two particularly high means in the
two Control conditions. Subjects in these two conditions
were quite likely to attribute a normal / not mentally ill
person's general tendency to behave in a particular way to a
general disposition on his part.
P(B|G'
)
. The analysis of variance for P(B|G') yielded
only one significant effect, a Path X Diagnosis interaction
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TABLE 12
Mean Estimates of P(b|g) as a Function
of Symptoms, Diagnosis, and Path
PATH
SYMPTOMS
Neurotic Normal
strong
riencai ly
111 .628 .623
Mentally 111 .578 .628
Weak
Fit: 1 1 L. cl X X y
111 .620 . 685
Mnf
Mentally 111 • 680 .561
Control I
1 Id 1 L. d X X y
111 . 725 .655
Not
Mentally 111 .660 .780
Control II
Mental ly
111
.665 .593
Not
Mentally 111 .675
.748
All
Mentally
111
.658 .640
Not
Mentally 111 .649
.702
(F = 3.68, df = 3,79, p <.025). The means for this interac-
tion are presented in Table 13. In order to elucidate the
nature of this interaction a test of the simple main effect
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of Diagnosis was conducted for each of the four paths. Only
the Control Path I main effect was significant (F = 13.49,
df = 1,19, p<.005). Subjects in this condition were rela-
tively unwilling to accept a dispositional interpretation for
a "not mentally ill" person's behavior in one situation when
that behavior did not generalize to other situations.
TABLE 13
Mean Estimates of P(b|gM for
Path X Diagnosis Interaction
PATH
DIAGNOSIS
Mentally 111
Not
Mentally 111
Strong .430 .463
Weak .416 .413
Control I .413 . 325
Control II .409 .364
P( b|
E
) . The analysis of variance for this variable
yielded two significant effects. An Adaptiveness main effect
(F = 8.24, df = 1,79, p<.005) showed that estimates of P(b|e)
were higher when the stimulus person's behavior was adaptive
than when his behavior was maladaptive. The means for the
other significant effect, the Symptoms X Diagnosis interaction
(F = 5.44, df = 1,79, p<.025) are presented in Table 14. The
pattern of means seems to suggest that subjects were more
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TABLE 14
Mean Estimates of P(b|E) for Symptoms X
Diagnosis Interaction
DIAGNOSIS
SYMPTOMS
Neurotic Normal
Mental ly
111 .602 .577
Not
Mentally
111
.576 .604
significant individual comparisons: none
willing to generalize an explanation for behavior when the
person's symptoms and diagnosis were consistent. However,
none of the individual comparisons of means was significant.
TABLE 15
Mean Estimates of P(b|E') for Path X
Adaptiveness Interaction
PATH
ADAPTIVENESS
Adaptive Maladaptive
Strong .390 .444
Weak .416 .440
Control I .331 .443
Control II .430 .393
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PiBj_EO_. The analysis of variance for P(B|E') revealed
a significant Adaptiveness main effect (F = 6.25, df = 1,79,
p <.025). Higher estimates of P(B|E') were obtained when the
person's behavior was maladaptive. In addition, a Path X
Adaptiveness interaction was obtained (F = 4.06, df = 3,79,
p <.01). The means for this interaction are shown in Table
15. The simple main effect of Adaptiveness was examined for
each path condition, and two significant effects were ob-
tained. Strong Path and Control Path I subjects' estimates of
P(b|E') were higher for maladaptive behavior items than for
adaptive behavior items. Thus the significant Adaptiveness
main effect is primarily attributable to these two groups.
Comparisons of Probabi 1 ity Estimates for Different De-
pendent Variables . A number of issues of interest may be
addressed by examining subjects' overall probability estimates
for the dependent variables employed in Part II. The mean
probabilities obtained for these dependent measures are pre-
sented in Table 16. The significance of the difference be-
tween particular pairs of means was evaluated by means of
correlated t-tests.^ The t-ratios for individual comparisons
of relevance to the present discussion are also included in
Table 16.
The correlation between variables used in computing a t-ratio
for a given comparison was based on 32 pairs of mean probabi-
lity judgments (see p. 92 ). Hence, the appropriate number of
degrees of freedom for each comparison is 31.
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TABLE 16
Mean Overall Probability Estimates for Several
Variables and Comparisons among Them
Variable Mean Compari son t
P(B) .604 P(E) vs. P(G) 10.99*
P(G) .555 P(E' ) vs. P(G) 11.76*
P(G ' ) .445 P(G') vs. P(E) 11.76*
P(E) .649 P(B G) vs. P(B G'
)
13.95*
P(E' ) . 351 P(B E) vs. P(B E' 13.43*
p(b|g) .662 p(b|g) vs. P(B) 6.64*
p(b|g' ) .404 p(b|e) vs. P(B) 1.51
p(b|e) .590 p(b|g) vs. p(b|e) 8.13*
P(b| E' ) .411
two-tailed p<.001, df = 31
As noted previously, in data obtained in Part I esti-
mates of P(E) were substantially higher than estimates of
P(G). It is of interest, then, to compare the probability
estimates of these variables obtained in Part II. As shown
in Table 16, estimates of P(E) in Part II were significantly
higher than estimates of P(G). A consideration of alterna-
tive interpretations of this finding will be deferred to the
Discussion section of this paper.
Another issue of concern is whether inferring that one
of the intermediate steps in the path model is not valid is
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psychologically equivalent to inferring that the other inter-
mediate step i_s valid. For example, it might be argued that
acceptance of E, a specific situational explanation for an
actor's initial behavior, is equivalent to acceptance of G',
an inference that his behavior does not generalize to other
situations. If E and G* are psychologically equivalent, one
would expect that subjects would assign equal probabilities
to them. Similarly, it might be proposed that acceptance of
the notion that the actor's behavior generalizes to other
situations is equivalent to inferring that a situational ex-
planation for his behavior is not valid. If this were the
case, then estimates of the probability of G and the probabi-
lity of E' should not differ.
Since G' and E' were not measured directly, but rather
were obtained by subtraction, it should be clear that if one
of the relationships described above holds, the other neces-
sarily follows [i.e., if P(E) = P(G'), then P(G) = P(E')].
It should also be noted that finding equal probabilities for
two inferences would not clearly establish their psychological
equivalency, but would merely be consistent with an equivalency
hypothesis. As is evident from Table 16, the data obtained
in our study were not consistent with such an hypothesis.
A final area of concern is the effect of the conditional
statements on estimates of the probability of B. Table 16
shows that estimates of P(B|G) were considerably higher than
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estimates of P(B|G'), and that estimates of P(B|E) were much
higher than estimates of P(B|E«), These comparisons offer
strong evidence that B was viewed as much more likely when
either of the intermediate inferences was described as true
rather than false. Table 16 also shows that estimates of
P(B|G) were higher than those of P(B) or of P(B|E). In
addition, the P(B|E) mean did not differ from the P(B) mean.
These comparisons offer some indirect support for the notion
that the Strong Path leads to stronger dispositional infer-
ences than the Weak Path.
Prediction of P(B) Using VJyer ' s Subjective Probability
Model . Two equations based on Wyer's conditional model of
information processing were used to predict the values of
P(B) obtained in Part II. The two equations are as follows:
1) P(B) = P(G)P(b|G) + P(G')P(B|G')
2) P(B) = P(E)P(b|E) + P(E')P(B|E')
The accuracy of the predictions generated by these equations
was assessed at both the group and individual levels.
The group predictions were based on the mean probability
estimates made by subjects in each of the four different Path
conditions for each of eight different stimulus combinations.
Thus, there were a total of 32 predicted and obtained means,
with each mean being based on an _n of 20 (for three Path con-
7
ditions) or 23 (for the Weak Path condition). The correla-
tion between the predicted P(B) based on Equation 1 and the
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obtained P(B) was .661. For Equation 2, the predicted and
obtained values correlated .608. Both of these correlations
were significant (p<.01, df = 30 in each case), and they
suggest that the model predicts reasonably well at the group
level. However, as shown in Table 17, the full equations
predict no more accurately than several of the elements or
products of elements making up the equations.
If the Path variable manipulated in Part I had a strong
effect on subjects' responses in Part II one might expect
that Equation 1, based on elements relevant to the Strong"
Path, would predict Strong Path subjects' estimates of P(B)
more accurately than those of Weak Path subjects. Following
similar reasoning, Equation 2 might be expected to predict
P(B) more accurately for Weak Path subjects than for Strong
Path subjects. A computation of the correlations between
predicted and obtained mean estimates of P(B) based on Equa-
tion 1 revealed rs of .534 and ^924 for the Strong and Weak
Path conditions, respectively. These two values did not dif-
fer significantly. The obtained correlation coefficients for
Equation 2 were -.367 and .629 for the Strong and Weak Path
conditions, respectively. Although the large discrepancy in
The relationship between these predicted values and sub-
jects' estimates of P(B) in Part I was also examined. The
relevant data are presented in Appendix D.
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TABLE 17
Correlations between Obtained Estimates
of P(B) and Other Variables
Variable
predicted P(B) based on
Wyer Equation 1 .661*
predicted P(B) based on
Wyer Equation 2 .608*
P(G)P(B G) . 788*
P(E)P(B| E) .776*
P(G) .767*
P(E) .795*
P(B|G) .677*
P(B| E) .455*
P(G')P(B|G') -.723*
P(E' )P(B E'
)
-.686*
P(B| G' ) -.119
P(B EM -. 327
•p < .01 , df = 30
these correlations suggests that Equation 2 predicts better
for the Weak Path group, each correlation is based on only
eight pairs of means and the two values do not differ signif-
icantly.
In Part II each subject made probability judgments for
eight different stimulus combinations. Thus, using one
V',
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of Wyer's equations, it was possible to derive a predicted
estimate of P(B) for each of the eight stimulus combinations,
and to compute the correlation between the predicted and ob-
tained values for a given subject. Individual correlations
based on each Wyer equation were computed for all subjects.
For Equation 1, the individual correlations ranged from -.916
to 1.00. The median individual correlation for all 83 sub-
jects was .478. Only 16 of the 83 individual correlations
based on Equation 1 were significant (p<.05, df =6). For
Equation 2, the individual correlations ranged from -.728 to
.943. The median correlation was .417. Thirteen individual
correlations based on this equation were significant. Thus,
the predictive power of Wyer's equations at the individual
level was relatively low, perhaps because of the small num-
ber of pairs of predicted and obtained values used to compute
these correlations.
In order to investigate the possibility that the Wyer
equations might predict individual estimates of P(B) with dif-
ferential accuracy for subjects exposed to different paths in
Part I, the range and median of the correlations for subjects
in each Path condition were obtained. These data are pre-
sented in Table 18. No statistical analyses of these data
were performed. However, there appears to be little indica-
tion that the predictive accuracy of either equation varies
as a function of the subjects' Path condition in Part I.
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TABLE 18
Range and Median of Individual Subjects' Correlations
between Predicted and Obtained Values of P(B)
PATH
EQUATION 1 EQUATION 2
Range Median Range Median
Strong -.352 to .811 .415 -.396 to .871 .434
Weak -.631 to 1.000 .438 -.728 to .943 . 341
Control I -.587 to .911 .591 -.249 to .814 .443
Control II -.916 to .833 .456 -.494 to .918 .452
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DISCUSSION
Findings Relevant to How Information about the Mentally
111 Is Processed
A number of hypotheses were advanced regarding the ex-
pected effects of the mental illness label. It was pre-
dicted that when a stimulus person had been diagnosed as
mentally ill, subjects would overgeneral ize his maladaptive
behavior and undergeneralize his adaptive behavior relative
to that of a stimulus person labeled as not mentally ill.
In addition, subjects were expected to be more likely to
explain the adaptive behavior of the mentally ill in situa-
tional terms than the same behavior performed by someone
who was described as not mentally ill. Situational explana-
tions for maladaptive behavior were predicted to be more
likely when the stimulus person was not mentally ill.
These intermediate inferences were hypothesized to offer
a partial explanation for the well-established finding
that people tend to attribute negative dispositions to the
mentally ill.
These predictions were based on the assumptions that
the generalization of behavior to unobserved situations would
facilitate the explanation of that behavior in general dispo-
sitional terms, and that the explanation of the same behavior
in situational terms would inhibit a general dispositional
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inference. These assumptions correspond to the prediction
that the intermediate inferences in the strong and weak paths
would be differentially linked to the final dispositional in-
ference. Since the predictions regarding the effects of the
mental illness label depend on the validity of these assumed
links, this issue will be examined before returning to our
discussion of the mental illness predictionso It was antici-
pated that the presumed tendency for the intermediate infer-
ence in the strong path to facilitate the final inference
would be reflected in a high positive correlation between
probability estimates for these two inferences. Such a cor-
relation was obtained. Since the intermediate inference in
the weak path was expected to inhibit the final inference,
a negative correlation between the probability estimates for
these inferences was expected. However, a relatively high
positive correlation was obtained.
These correlational data are consistent with an hypo-
thesis that the intermediate inferences in both paths facil-
itate the final inference. However, as is inherent in the
nature of correlational data, these results do not establish
a causal connection between the two inferences in a given
path. In our study, there are other available data which
bear on this issue. Subjects in the Control Path I condition
were not exposed to either intermediate inference, yet their
estimates of the probability of the final inference (i.e..
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the only inference for them) were higher than those of the
subjects exposed to either path involving an intermediate in-
ference. This suggests that the intermediate inferences may
have had an inhibiting rather than a facilitative effect on
the final inference. The correlational data cited above,
which appear to be inconsistent with this interpretation, may
in fact suggest that both the intermediate and final infer-
ences were caused by the information contained in the initial
behavior descriptions. The low estimates of P(B) found in
the Control Path II condition, in which no initial behavior
descriptions were presented, support this interpretation.
However, the estimates of conditional probabilities obtained
in Part II are not entirely congruent with this interpreta-
tion. The finding that P(b|g) was higher than either P(b|e)
or P(B) suggests that the intermediate inference in the strong
path had a facilitative effect on the final inference. And,
although one would not want to place great weight on this
finding, the analysis of covariance showed that estimates of
P(B) in the Strong Path condition were nonsignificantly
higher than those in the Weak Path condition when the strength
of the intermediate inferences in the two paths was statisti-
cally equated.
Taken together, then, the available data do not present
a consistent picture. It seems reasonable to conclude that
there is no unambiguous evidence which suggests that the
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intermediate inference in the weak path facilitates the final
inference. With respect to the strong path, there is some
evidence that the intermediate inference has a facilitative
effect on the final inference. However, in the most direct
tests of this hypothesis [i.e., the P(B) analyses of vari-
ance and covariance in Part I] , the two paths involving in-
termediate inferences did not differ significantly, and both
of them proved to be weaker than the path involving a direct
inference.
The implications of these path differences will be ex-
plored more fully in the next section. For present purposes,
it is sufficient to note that the tests of the hypotheses
regarding the effects of the mental illness variable were not
entirely adequate because of deficiencies in the operationali-
zation of the model tested in this study.
In examining the data obtained in Part I there is no
evidence which clearly supports the hypotheses about the ef-
• fects of the Diagnosis variable. However, the Adaptiveness
X Diagnosis interactions for subjects' estimates of P(G) and
P(E) in Part II do support our hypotheses. Subjects were un-
willing to generalize the maladaptive behavior of a person
diagnosed as not mentally ill to unobserved situations. They
were also unwilling to accept situational explanations for
the maladaptive behavior of a person who had been diagnosed
as mentally ill.
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Although no specific predictions were made about the
effects of the Symptoms variable, several effects of inter-
est were obtained. The Adaptiveness X Symptoms interactions
obtained in the analyses of estimates of P(B) for both parts
of the experiment generally show that subjects tended to
attribute positive and negative general dispositions with
about equal frequency to neurotic stimulus persons. However,
negative dispositions were much less strongly attributed
than positive dispositions when the stimulus person mani-
fested normal symptoms.
The finding that the Adaptiveness X Symptoms interac-
tion was particularly strong among subjects in the Control
Path II condition is of particular interest. Subjects in
this condition were not exposed to the initial behavior de-
scriptions, and their attributions of general dispositions
tended to conform more closely to stereotypic judgments than
those of other subjects (i.e., negative dispositions were
quite strongly attributed to neurotic persons and positive
dispositions to normal persons). This suggests that the in-
formation that a person had engaged in a specific behavior
lessened the impact of the Symptoms manipulation. It appears
that subjects may have most strongly used the information
about the person's symptoms to make inferences about his
dispositions when little other information was available.
This line of reasoning is similar to that advanced by
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Crocetti, Spiro, and Siassi (1974). These authors suggest
that stereotypical views regarding the stigmatized tend to
be elicited when the perceiver receives little or no infor-
mation about the person other than that relating to his
stigma. This pattern of information may, quite reasonably,
suggest to the respondent that the information about the
person's stigmatizing condition should be weighted quite
heavily. This sort of argument would suggest that the Diag-
nosis manipulation might have yielded similar, stereotypical
responses in the Control Path II condition. However, the
failure to obtain such an effect may be due to the relative
strength of the Diagnosis and Symptoms variables. We shall
discuss this issue below.
The Symptoms X Diagnosis interactions obtained for sub-
jects' estimates of P(b|g) and P(b|e) were not strong ef-
fects, but each showed a moderate tendency for subjects to
make higher probability estimates when the person's symptoms
and diagnosis were consistent (e.g., normal symptoms / not
mentally ill diagnosis). This suggests that the information
contained in one variable may lead to a more confident judg-
ment when supporting evidence from another variable is avail-
able. This notion is intuitively plausible, and is consis-
tent with a number of information processing approaches (see
Wyer, 1974). However, it is somewhat surprising that the
nature of the two-way interaction did not depend on the
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Adaptiveness variable. Tnis variable may be viewed as pro-
viding another consistent or inconsistent source of informa-
tion for the subject, and might have been expected to inter-
act with the Symptoms and Diagnosis variables. Perhaps the
fact that the judgments requested were conditional probabil-
ities is relevant. Since the conditional estimates require
subjects to assume that the intermediate inference is valid,
they might effectively eliminate the possibility for sub-
jects to consider issues which normally might bear on their
judgment (e.g., "Is he the kind of person who would generall\
engage in this kind of maladaptive behavior?").
On the basis of our literature review, one might have
expected the Diagnosis variable to have had much stronger
effects than the Symptoms variable in our study. In fact,
each variable was involved in a few, moderately strong ef-
fects. Thus, the overall impact of the two variables was
quite comparable, and our data do not appear to be consis-
tent with the proposition that the mental illness label is
much more disturbing to people than neurotic symptoms. How-
ever, our failure to support this proposition may have been
due to the methodological limitations of our study, rather
than to the validity of the proposition. Two possible metho
ological problems of possible relevance to this issue are
discussed below.
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The first possible limitation involves the relative
strength of the Symptoms and Diagnosis manipulations. The
interpretation of the relative impact of two variables de-
pends on the relative strength of their manipulations. This
is very hard to evaluate, since it is often difficult to
compare the two variables on a single, appropriate dimen-
sion. With this in mind, one may speculate that, if any-
thing, the Diagnosis variable in our study may have been
less strongly manipulated. We chose to manipulate this vari-
able in a straightforward, direct manner by simply indicating
that the person had been diagnosed as mentally ill or as not
mentally ill. However, this particular manipulation may have
been relatively weak in two senses. First, the brevity of
the diagnosis information may have caused it to be overshad-
owed by the more lengthy symptoms information. Secondly,
the description of a person as "not mentally ill" may be
viewed as faint praise, and may not have been as dramatically
different from a "mentally ill" diagnosis as would have been
desirable,
A second possible methodological limitation involves the
characteristics of our subjects. The average age of the high
school students we used was approximately sixteen. Adelson
(1975) has recently reviewed some literature which suggests
that the individual's capacity to deal effectively with ab-
stract political concepts (e.g., political parties, education.
105
the church) is not fully developed until he is approximately
eighteen. Between the ages of twelve and eighteen a steady
shift away from the usage of concrete referents (e.g., a
particular school, the jail) to more abstract referents is ob-
served. In our study, the diagnosis information required
subjects to interpret the behavior of an individual described
by an abstract term (mentally ill or not mentally ill). The
Symptoms manipulation involved the presentation of much more
specific information about a particular individual's idio-
syncratic features. The symptoms information might be more
easily processed at a lower level of abstraction than the
diagnosis information. In Abelson's (1976) terms, the symp-
toms information could be processed episodically. It seems
likely that sixteen-year-olds manifest a greater preference
for episodic processing than do adults. The apparent lack
of impact of the Diagnosis variable in our study relative to
previous research may be due to the fact that our subjects
were cognitively unprepared to process information at the
level of abstraction the manipulation required, rather than
to the weakness of the manipulation.
The Adaptiveness main effects which were found for every
c
dependent measure except P(b|g') were quite strong. They ap-
pear to reflect the well-known "positivity bias" found in
several areas of social perception research (see, e.g.. Burn-
stein, 1969; Sears and Whitney, 1972), and are of little
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particular relevance to the major issues investigated in our
study.
In general, the inferential path model tested seems to
show moderate promise as a device for helping to suggest one
process by which people might arrive at negative disposi-
tional attributions about the mentally ill. The unintended
features of the model as operationalized in our study did
not allow an unambiguous test of our hypotheses regarding
differential information processing as a function of the
mental illness label and other variables. In spite of this,
we obtained support for several of our predictions. The
general features of the model and its implications for more
general social inference processes are discussed in the next,
section.
General Features of the Inferential Path Model
We have already discussed the fact that both of the paths
involving intermediate inferences yielded lower estimates of
P(B) than the direct inference path. This unexpected find-
ing, as noted previously, makes it difficult to assess the
validity of our predictions of 'differential information pro-
cessing as a function of the mental illness label. However,
in spite of this difficulty, the finding is potentially a
very interesting one. Two possible explanations for this
result will now be offered.
The first explanation is based on the assumption that
the intermediate inferences sensitized subjects to the pos-
sibility that the stimulus person's initial behavior might
not be best explained in general dispositional terms. For
subjects in the Weak Path condition, the inclusion of E
might well have raised the possibility that the stimulus per-
son's disposition to behave in a certain way was limited to
a particular type of situation. For Strong Path subjects
the inclusion of G may have led them to consider the possi-
bility that the initial behavior would not generalize to un-
observed situations. If these respective cognitions were
particularly salient for these subjects as a result of their
exposure to the intermediate inferences in their paths, then
their greater caution in assigning general dispositions to
actors may be explained on the basis of the salience of these
cognitions.
For Strong Path subjects the intermediate inference may
have functioned similarly to McArthur's (1972) high distinc-
tiveness manipulation, in the sense of conveying information
that the person's behavior should not be generalized across
stimuli. If this speculation is valid, then our results are
consistent with McArthur's finding that high distinctiveness
inhibited attributions of causality to the person.
Of course, the inclusion of the intermediate steps might
have increased the salience of other cognitions as well as
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those mentioned above. Some such cognitions might be expected
to enhance the probability of a general dispositional attri-
bution (e.g., the cognition that the person's behavior might
generalize across stimuli). The explanation advanced, then,
depends on the assumption that cognitions associated with en-
hanced attribution to the person were made less salient by
our intermediate inferences than cognitions associated with
decreased attribution to the person. This assumption is con-
sistent with an intuitive analysis of subjects' experiences
in the different conditions. In the Control Path I condition
subjects received the initial behavior description (A) and
were asked for a judgment of the probability that the stimu-
lus person had a general disposition which was related to
that behavior Cp(B)]. Since B was always plausibly related
to A, and since no other inferential possibility was pre-
sented, the subjects assigned relatively high probabilities
to B. In the Strong and Weak Path conditions, however, the
information presented was more complex, and suggested many
inferential possibilities. This may have led these subjects
to question the simple inference, "A suggests B." It appears
that the complexity of the information presented may have led
subjects toward greater caution in their interpretations of
it.
A second interpretation of the finding that estimates of
P(B) were higher in the Control Path I condition than in either
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experimental condition is based on the subject's need to ex-
plain the initial evidence sentence he receives. According
to this interpretation the subject's principal motivation is
to explain A, and the paths involving two inferences give
him two opportunities to do so. If the intermediate and
final steps in the experimental paths are considered as
basically independent alternative explanations for A, then
the attribution of a certain amount of causality to one pos-
sible source would lessen the need to attribute causality
to the other source. In the Strong and Weak Path conditions,
G and E, respectively, might be viewed as absorbing some of
the causality which would be attributed to B if they were
not presented. Control Path I subjects' estimates of P(B)
would be expected to be higher, since only one causal explana-
tion for A was presented to them.
Although this explanation might seem to be relevant to
only the Weak Path condition, in which E was known to be
considered a very good explanation for A, it is also appli-
cable to the Strong Path condition. Even though G was not
considered as adequate an explanation for A as E was, it
nevertheless was considered as having a certain amount of
explanatory value. (The average "G" was rated by pretest
subjects as about midway between "fair" and "good" as an
explanation for A.)
The effects of the Path variable on subjects' judgments
in Part II are difficult to summarize or interpret. However,
in general they seem to indicate that subjects exposed to
one of the experimental path conditions in Part I were more
cautious in their judgments in Part II, and less influenced
by the independent variables. Such a tendency is generally
consistent with the first interpretation offered above, in
the sense that subjects who were required to "think more" by
being exposed to more complex information in Part I appeared
to exercise somewhat greater caution throughout the experi-
ment.
Another major finding regarding the nature of the path
model which has not yet been fully explored is that sub-
jects' overall estimates of P(E) were consistently higher
than their estimates of P(G). One possible interpretation
of this finding is relatively trivial theoretically, in that
it is based on the wording of the stimulus materials. The
question designed to measure P(G) asked subjects about the
generalization of behavior to "a wide variety of situations."
In retrospect, this phrase may have been too strong. How-
ever, the phrase was chosen in order to eliminate the ambi-
guity which other phrases such as simply "other situations"
were shown to have in pilot testing. More extensive tests
of the effects of various wordings could be conducted quite
easily.
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A more interesting explanation for the finding is based
on the assumption that people's need to explain phenomena is
a pervasive motivational force. The assumption that people
are motivated to make sense of their social world is, of
course, a central one of long-standing in social perception
research (cf., Hastorf, Schneider, and Polefka, 1970). In
their well-known study, Heider and Simmel (1944) showed that
subjects were quite willing to assume that even the relation-
ships among inanimate geometrical forms presented in a film
were causal in nature. Several interesting studies have re-
cently suggested that an orientation toward interpreting
events in causal terms may prevent one from using all of the
information available to him in a rational manner (e.g.,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman and Tversky, 1973).
If we assume that there is a bias toward inferences of cau-
sality, then the greater probabilities subjects assigned to
E than to G in our study are consistent with such a bias.
As discussed previously, the items in our study were selected
so that E was viewed as a more adequate explanation for A
than G was. The data from our study may be viewed as con-
sistent with a general proposition that there is a pervasive
tendency to associate cognitions which are causally linked.
A final issue related to the features of our inferen-
tial path model is the sequence in which information is pro-
cessed. Initially we proposed that subjects in the experi-
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mental path conditions would process information in a sequen-
tial fashion. For example, in the Strong Path condition
subjects were expected to use the information provided about
the characteristics of the actor and the behavior he per-
formed to make inferences about how likely it was that behav-
ior would generalize to other situations. If the subject
concluded that the behavior was highly likely to generalize,
then that inference was expected to lead to an attribution of
causality to a general disposition of the actor.
It is interesting to compare this hypothesized infer-
ential sequence with one proposed by McArthur (1972). As
one part of her study McArthur investigated subjects' expec-
tations for stimulus generalization (i.e., their estimates of
the probability that a response to one stimulus would occur
in the presence of another, specifically mentioned stimulus).
One hypothesis she investigated was that low consensus in-
formation (i.e., the information that few people respond the
way the actor does to a certain stimulus) would lead to attri-
butions of causality to the person, which would then lead to
the expectation that he would behave similarly in the pres-
ence of other stimuli. Although the two studies differed
in a number of respects, and McArthur 's consensus variable
is not of particular relevance to our major concerns, the
contradiction in the inferential sequences proposed is ap-
parent. McArthur suggested that attributions of causality
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to the person would lead to the expectation that behavior
would generalize; we proposed the opposite sequence.
McArthur found virtually no evidence which supported
her hypothesis. However, the evidence from our study rele-
vant to this issue is only partially consistent with our
hypothesis. In Part II, when subjects were asked to assume
that the stimulus person's behavior generalized, they were
very likely to attribute it to a general disposition of the
actor. However, in Part I there was little evidence to sup-
port the hypothesis that the generalization of behavior
facilitated its explanation in general dispositional terms.
In addition, we found little evidence that explaining behav-
ior in situational terms either inhibited or enhanced the
probability of a general dispositional inference.
The data obtained in both studies, then, provide little
evidence that subjects spontaneously process information in
either proposed sequence. More adequate tests of the present
model would certainly be appropriate, particularly in view of
the unintended differences in the strength of the interme-
diate inferences in the two experimental paths. McArthur 's
hypothesized sequence of processing seems worthy of further
investigation also. In short, both sequences seem logical,
and intuitively it seems that people "ought to" process in- •
formation in accord with one or both of them.
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However, in the absence of further research designed to
clarify the issue, it seems appropriate to at least raise the
possibility that neither hypothesized sequence describes the
way people typically process information. It seems reason-
able to assume that information about behavior is used to
make various kinds of inferences, including the types of
generalizations and explanations we investigated. However,
it may be that these inferences are made more on the basis
of parallel rather than serial processing (Neisser, 1967),
For example, the information that a neurotic person diagnosed
as mentally ill threw a temper tantrum when his wife's par-
ents were visiting might lead to a number of inferences, made
with varying degrees of confidence. A perceiver might con-
sider it quite plausible that the actor lacked self-control
when in the presence of his in-laws, equally plausible that
he lacked self-control in many different situations, and
highly likely that he would throw temper tantrums in various
kinds of situations. He might view these inferences as re-
flecting possibilities which are primarily independent of
one another, although he could conceive of ways in which each
might be either consistent or inconsistent with the others.
The extent to which such complex contingencies are consid-
ered by individuals in most information processing situa-
tions is unclear. One model which represents an attempt to
examine the more complex inferences which people make is
that of Wyer (1970). The relevance of his model to the pres-
ent research topic is discussed in the following section.
Applicability of Wyer's Subjective Probability Model
The results of our study showed that the predictive ac-
curacy of both Wyer equations at the group level was sub-
stantially better than chance, but well below that obtained
in some of Wyer's own work (e.g., Wyer, 1970, 1973). Wyer
(1974) has reviewed a number of studies which show that his
subjective probability model predicts newly formed beliefs
about hypothetical individuals more accurately than previously
formed beliefs about real people. The stimulus persons in
the present study were implicitly hypothetical, and were
clearly not real people with whom the subjects had inter-
acted. On this basis, one might have expected that the Wyer
equations would have predicted subjects' responses with higher
accuracy. However, at least two factors seem likely to have
attenuated the relationship between predicted and obtained
values in the present study.
First, while subjects did not have well-formed beliefs
about the specific stimulus persons they made judgments
about in our study, it seems reasonable to assume that their
beliefs about the categories of persons the stimulus persons
represented were quite well-formed prior to the experiment.
Mental illness is a complex emotional issue which is likely
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to arouse many previous cognitive associations and beliefs
in most people. The influence of these "extraneous" beliefs
on subjects' judgments is undoubtedly more powerful than when
one deals with more innocuous material.
Secondly, in Wyer's work, the predicted and obtained
values used in assessing the predictive validity of an equa-
tion at the group level are typically calculated on the basis
of the relevant mean probability estimates for all subjects
comprising the group. Within a given group, all of the
subjects have generally been exposed to identical stimuli.
In the present study a similar procedure was followed, but
subjects constituting a group for whom means were calculated
were not exposed to identical stimuli. Rather, they were ex-
posed to stimuli designed to represent a particular combina-
tion of independent variables (e.g., a person who had been
diagnosed as mentally ill, exhibited neurotic symptoms, and
had engaged in an adaptive behavior). The fact that the
specific content of the stimulus materials received by mem-
bers of a group varied among members would be expected to
result in less uniform probability estimates than would be
obtained if the stimuli were identical. In effect, an addi-
tional source of error of measurement was introduced into
our study which should logically be expected to lower the
predictive accuracy of the equations tested.
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In view of these considerations, the predictive utility
of Wyer's equations at the group level in our study seems
relatively high. However, it is to be recalled that the full
equations predicted subjects' estimates of P(B) no more ac-
curately than several of the individual terms or products of
terms making up the equations. Of particular interest is the
fact that the first components of both equations [P(G)P(b|G)
for Equation 1, and P(E)P(b|s) for Equation 2] were very
strongly correlated with obtained estimates of P(B). In-
cluding the second components of the equations did not en-
hance the relationship between predicted and obtained values;
in fact, the correlations based on the full equations were
somewhat lower than those based on the first components, A
recent study by Wyer (1975) suggests a possible reason for
this finding. In this study Wyer employed a functional mea-
surement technique (Anderson, 1970), which provides the most
sophisticated test to date of whether the relationships among
the probabilities making up the model are those implied by
the model. One implication of the model is that both condi-
tional probabilities in Wyer's equations should be positively
related to obtained estimates of P(B).
In Wyer's study subjects were provided with information
designed to experimentally manipulate the conditional prob-
abilities, and the expected relationships were obtained. In
our study P(b|g) and P(b|e) were positively correlated with
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obtained estimates of P(B), as would be expected if the model
is valid. However, P(b|g') and P(b|e') were found to be un-
related to P(B). This is inconsistent with the model, and
appears to account for the reduced predictive validity of
the Wyer equations when the second components were included.
The psychological significance of this explanation is un-
clear, however. Perhaps it reflects the fact that subjects
do not process information about the likelihood of B given
that an intermediate inference is known to be false in making
their initial estimates of P(B). It is possible that the
only contingencies involving the intermediate inference
which they process are those which involve the assumption
that the intermediate step is at least moderately likely.
It is of interest to note that, although Wyer's func-
tional measurement study differed in many respects from the
present study, one of his major findings was consistent with
our results. Wyer found that the terms of the first compo-
nent of his equation were related to all other terms and com-
ponents in the manner implied by his subjective probability
model. However, the conditional probability in the second
component of his equation did not show the expected relation-
ships. The error in predicting obtained values of P(B) was
attributable to the second conditional. Since the error of
estimate was quite small in this study, Wyer argued that the
proposed equation did not need to be modified. However, he
indicated that a slightly altered model involving differen-
tial weighting of the second component of his equation en-
hanced predictability somewhat. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to note that the limitations of the model found
in the present study and in Wyer's study were both due to
the same component.
The present study provides further evidence that Wyer's
subjective probability model is a quite general one which may
be profitably applied to a variety of research issues. Our
study represents an extension of the model in two ways. A
new content area, attitudes toward the mentally ill, was ex-
plored. In addition, the cognitions involved in the experi-
ment included generalizations and explanations of specific
behaviors, rather than the more typically investigated judg-
ments of attraction, similarity, or the probability of the
occurrence of various specific events.
Although the model predicts reasonably well at the group
level, the problems associated with its second component sug-
gest that it does not accurately describe the manner in which
information is processed. The large variability in the corre-
lations between predicted and obtained estimates of P(B) for
individual subjects suggests that, while the model may be
descriptive for some subjects, for a large majority it does
not appear to be. Perhaps the greatest value of the model
is as a heuristic device which can stimulate researchers to
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consider issues which would otherwise be ignored. For ex-
ample, in the present study, the conditional probability es-
timates provided a great deal of valuable information which
enhanced our understanding of the inferential path model
which was of primary interest. It is unlikely that these
conditional probabilities would have been measured if Wyer's
model had not been considered as the experiment was being
designed
.
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Symptoms — Normal
Diagnosis — Not mentally ill (For mentally ill diagnosis,
"not" omitted from first sentence)
Dan P. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He en-joys gardening in his spare time. He plants nearly ^ acre
every spring with vegetables and flowers. Dan spends many
hours tending his plants and sells some of his produce at
a roadside garden stand.
Frank T. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He
has a strong interest in old automobiles. He has restored
two cars recently. He would like to sell one of them and buy
another car to restore. Much of Frank's spare time is spent
reading about, looking at, and working on old cars.
Jim L. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He is
very interested in sports. He spends most of his leisure
time participating in various athletic programs himself or
watching sports programs on television. Jim hopes to be
able to attend the 1976 Olympic Games as a spectator.
Joe M. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He en-
joys music a great deal. He plays the piano by ear and
has recently bought an electric organ for his home. He
attends the opera or ballet at least once a month, and is
considering learning to play either the guitar or flute.
Robert W. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He
works full-time in his father's hardware store. He has been
there for several years and hopes to take over the business
completely within five years. Robert has recently expanded
the sporting goods section and hired two new part-time employ-
ees,
Tom A. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He works
as an insurance salesman. He sells life, automobile, and home
insurance, but focuses primarily on life insurance. Tom
works very hard at his job, and typically devotes about sixty
hours a week to it.
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Symptoms — Neurotic
Diagnosis — Not mentally ill (For mentally ill diagnosis,
"not" omitted from first sentence)
David J. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He is
unhappy with his life. He feels extremely tense about a lot
of things, but can't define very specifically what would make
him feel better. Every once in a while David experiences a
strong feeling that something terrible is about to happen,
but it never does.
Doug J. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He is
very seriously concerned about his physical health. He
tends to see many minor bodily sensations as possible signs
of serious organic problems. Doug has spent a great deal
of money on medical expenses, ana has given up many of his
usual social activities because of his health problems.
Roger D. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He is
sometimes overwhelmed by a desire to hit his father. One
particular fantasy continually recurs in his mind, in which
he becomes very angry and strikes his father at a family
gathering. This scene is very disturbing to Roger, but some-
times he just can't get it out of his mind and can't concen-
trate on any other thoughts.
Paul M. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He
worries a lot about little things. He often finds himself
feeling very anxious without really knowing why. Paul can't
sleep nights, brooding about the past and worrying about
things that might go wrong.
Harold T. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He
is afraid of heights. Harold becomes very fearful whenever
he thinks about being in a tall building, near the summit
of a mountain, or even at the top of a long ladder. He be-
lieves that his fear of heights is basically irrational,
but that only seems to make the intense anxiety he experiences
harder to accept.
Martin B. was recently diagnosed as not mentally ill. He is
frequently depressed. He cannot concentrate on his work,
has little self-confidence, and has difficulty sleeping.
Martin sees the world as too difficult to cope with, and
tends to exaggerate his personal shortcomings and setbacks.
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The first eight items are adaptive behavior items- the second
Int Pa?h%"'i'?'^''""- ^^^"^ items fo^ the differ'e t conditions is as follows:
Strong Path
A
How likely is it that G7
How likely is it that B?
Weak Path
A
How likely is it that E?
How likely is it that B?
Control Path I
A
How likely is it that B?
Control Path II
How likely is it that B?
Item 1
He initiates a pleasant conversation with an acquaintance he
runs into at a local baseball game. (A)
He initiates pleasant conversations in a wide variety of
situations, (G)
He enjoys people when at local recreational activities. (E)
He enjoys people in a wide variety of situations. (B)
Item 2
When a volunteer from the local community chest comes to his
door, he donates a substantial amount of money. (A)
He donates substantial amounts of money in a wide variety of
situations. (G)
He is a generous person when personally asked for a donation
to a local charity. (E)
He is a generous person in a wide variety of situations. (B)
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Item 3
He relaxes at home with his family on weekends. (A)
He relaxes in a wide variety of situations. (G)
He is comfortable when at home with his family. (E)
He is comfortable in a wide variety of situations. (B)
Item 4
He sees a neighbor out shoveling snow, and helps complete
the job. (A)
He helps people in a wide variety of situations. (G)
He is a considerate person when he sees a neighbor who needs
help. (E)
He is a considerate person in a wide variety of situations.
(B)
Item 5
He goes to bed early when he feels a cold coming on. (A)
He goes to bed early in a wide variety of situations. (G)
He is concerned about maintaining good health when he feels
bad. (E)
He is concerned about maintaining good health in a wide
variety of situations. (B)
Item 6
While having dinner with friends, he notices that a particu-
lar topic of conversation is upsetting to his wife, and he
changes the subject. (A)
He steers the conversation away from upsetting topics in a
wide variety of situations. (G)
He is responsive to his wife's feelings in social situa-
tions. (E)
He is responsive to people's feelings in a wide variety of
situations, (B) *
Item 7
He plays football with his daughters after a good day at
work. (A)
He plays games with his daughters in a wide variety of situa-
tions. (G)
He enjoys playing games when he is in a good mood. (E)
He enjoys playing games in a wide variety of situations. (B)
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Item 8
He writes a letter to the editor of a local newspaper aboutthe local race for mayor. (A)
He writes letters to the editor about a wide variety of pub-lic issues. (G)
He is deeply concerned about the local mayoral race. (E)
He is deeply concerned about a wide variety of public issues.
( B
)
Item 9
At an exciting basketball game he remains almost motionless.
(A)
He remains almost motionless in a wide variety of situations.
(G)
He is apathetic about basketball games. (E)
He is apathetic in a wide variety of situations. (B)
Item 10
He threatens his son with physical injury if he doesn't shape
up. (A)
He threatens people in a wide variety of situations. (G)
He is cruel to his children when angry with them. (E)
He is cruel in a wide variety of situations. (B)
Item 11
On the way to the grocery store, he takes the money he planned
to spend on food and buys himself a new tape recorder. (A)
He spends grocery money on other things in a wide variety of
situations. (G)
He has little control of his impulses when it comes to handl-
ing finances. (E)
He has little control of his impulses in a wide variety of
situations. (G)
Item 12
Upset by reports regarding current political events, he calls
the police and reports (falsely) that a bomb is scheduled to
go off in a public building. (A)
He makes false bomb reports in a wide variety of situations.
(G)
He is spiteful toward others when upset by political condi-
tions. (E)
He is spiteful toward others in a wide variety of situations.
(B)
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Item 13
When his wife's parents are visiting, he throws a temper
tantrum. (A)
He throws temper tantrums in a wide variety of situations.
(G)
He lacks self-control when his wife's parents are visiting.
(E)
He lacks self-control in a wide variety of situations. (B)
Item 14
He goes to a bar, gets drunk, and gets into a fight with
someone. (A)
He gets into fights in a wide variety of situations. (G)
He is aggressive when drunk. (E)
He is aggressive in a wide variety of situations. (B)
Item 15
He is introduced to a person at a party, and insults his new
acquaintance. (A)
He insults people in a wide variety of situations. (G)
He is socially awkward when he meets new people at parties.
(E)
He is socially awkward in a wide variety of situations. (B)
Item 16
He sees someone he dislikes, and asks a series of embarrass-
ing personal questions. (A)
He asks embarrassing personal questions in a wide variety of
situations. (G)
He is rude when he encounters someone he dislikes. (E)
He is rude in a wide variety of situations. (B)
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Significant Analysis of Variance Effects
Involving Sex of Subject
DEPENDENT VARIABLE EFFECT* F df P <
P(G) , Part II ADPH 4.76 3,75 .0005
P(E) , Part II DH 4.09 1 ,75 .05
P(B|G) , Part II DH 4.61 1 ,75 .05
P(B|G) , Part II ASDH 4.41 1 ,75 .05
•A = Adaptiveness, D = Diagnosis, P = Path, H = Sex of Sub-
ject, S = Symptoms
APPENDIX D
Correlations between Estimates of P(B) Obtained
in Part I and Predicted Values of P(B) Based
on Group Data Obtained in Part II
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Correlations between Estimates of P(B) Obtained
in Part I and Predicted Values of P(B) Based
on Group Data Obtained in Part II
EQUATION*
PATH
All Paths Strong Path Weak Path
Equation 1 .471 (df=30) .753 (df=6) .743 (df-6)
Equation 2 .445 (df=30) .155 (df=6) .902 (df=6)
•see body of paper

